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A B S T R A C T .  With the rise of nativist policies throughout the world, the growing dangers posed 
by climate change and rising income inequality, and ever-increasing threats to the rule of law, 
many turn to the institutions of democracy to achieve desired policy goals.  Indeed, if one seeks 
to address climate change, preserve the rule of law, or reduce income inequality, functioning 
institutions are needed to further such objectives.  But the ability to leverage institutions to 
achieve legal and policy goals presupposes a common understanding of institutions as well as an 
appreciation for the ways in which they can and may function.  Traditional comparative 
institutional analysis uses this functional understanding to identify which institutional setting—
typically the political process, the markets, or the courts—is the preferred means of achieving 
one’s chosen legal or policy goals. 
This Article argues that merely differentiating between these institutional settings is 
insufficient to conduct a meaningful comparative analysis.  Such a narrow view of institutional 
settings, what I will call institutional systems and the institutions they contain, leaves much to be 
desired, particularly as the scale and complexity of both problems and proposed solutions 
continue to grow.  Indeed, this monolithic, one-dimensional view of institutions is ill-equipped 
to address the scale and scope of contemporary, collective-action problems.  This Article develops 
an approach to comparative institutional analysis that recognizes the rich, multi-dimensional 
aspects of not only the characteristics of institutions but also the problems institutions are asked 
to solve.  By embracing a robust and comprehensive view of institutions, this new approach to 
comparative institutional analysis offers a more meaningful and informative foundation upon 
which to pursue solutions to the complex societal problems of today and those that will emerge in 
the future. 
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I NT R ODUC T I ON 
[W]e are just temporary occupants of this office.  That makes us guardians of those democratic 
institutions and traditions -- like rule of law, separation of powers, equal protection and civil 
liberties -- that our forebears fought and bled for.  Regardless of the push and pull of daily politics, 
it’s up to us to leave those instruments of our democracy at least as strong as we found them.1 
Institutions are all around us.  And the institutions of the political and legal 
order are under threat.  Depending on one’s political perspective, the election of 
Donald J. Trump to the United States presidency, the “Brexit” vote, and the rise of a 
conservative populism indicate that institutions are evolving in some way, for better 
or worse.  Extant institutions are no longer viable bulwarks against an apparent 
erosion of rights and weakening of the power of certain elites.2  Yet the very survival 
of societies depends on the functioning of their institutions to protect civil and 
political rights and to preserve the rule of law.3  As Daron Acemoglu and James A. 
Robinson show, the strength of a nation’s institutions helps determine its lasting 
power over time.4  Many commentators from across the political spectrum also put 
their faith in the role that institutions will play in ensuring the rule of law, the 
survival of democracy as a political system, and the future of the planet.5  The 
                                                                    
1  Letter from President Barack Obama to Donald Trump, quoted in Kevin Liptak, Exclusive: Read 
the Inauguration Day Letter Obama Left for Trump, CNN (Sept. 5, 2017, 2:25 PM), http://www.cnn.com
/2017/09/03/politics/obama-trump-letter-inauguration-day/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z8QV-
YWQN].  See also Senator Jeff Flake’s (R-AZ) statement upon announcing he is not seeking re-
election in 2018: 
We must never regard as normal the regular and casual undermining of our democratic norms and ideals. 
We must never meekly accept the daily sundering of our country.  The personal attacks, the threats 
against principles, freedoms and institution, the flagrant disregard for truth and decency. 
Full Transcript: Jeff Flake’s Speech on the Senate Floor, N.Y. Times (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/10/24/us/politics/jeff-flake-transcript-senate-speech.html [https://perma.cc/2
HV6-65ZB]. 
2  See Eric A. Posner, Liberal Internationalism and the Populist Backlash, 49 Ariz. St. L.J. 795, 812–13 
(2016) (describing the populist backlash to the international legal order); Uri Friedman, Trust in 
Government Is Collapsing Around the World: The Trend Helps Explain Trump and Brexit. What’s Next?, 
Atlantic Monthly (July 1, 2016) (describing the decline in trust in government generally). 
3  For a discussion of the interplay between rule of law, legitimacy, rights, and institutions, see 
generally Samuel J. M. Donnelly, Reflecting on the Rule of Law: Its Reciprocal Relation with Rights, 
Legitimacy, and Other Concepts and Institutions, 603 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 37 (2006). 
4  Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, 
Prosperity, and Poverty 428–37 (2012). 
5  A range of commentators from across the political spectrum have expressed their belief in 
the durability of institutions to preserve democracy, while others have argued otherwise.  For a 
sample of these perspectives, see Adam Liptak, Donald Trump Could Threaten U.S. Rule of Law, 
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presence and robustness of such institutions are also critical features in ensuring 
economic growth; indeed, it is the absence of durable and responsive institutions 
that may be driving, at least in part, the populist backlash to the very policies that 
might support such growth.6 
Furthermore, as the incidence and complexity of broad-scale societal and 
planetary threats increase, so does the importance of robust and effective 
institutions.  Threats such as climate change, globalization, new technologies, and 
rising economic inequality require coordinated institutional actions capable of 
benefitting society and protecting its interests as times change.7  The need for 
institutional evolution is even more demanding and acute given the accelerating 
pace of change itself, testing the limits of existing institutions.8  Regardless of one’s 
political affinity or policy preferences, developing an understanding of what 
institutions are and how they function is critical to the pursuit of such preferences, 
whatever they might be.9 
Historically, the discipline of comparative institutional analysis, most closely 
associated with Neil Komesar, has attempted to address the question of how to 
                                                                    
Scholars Say, N.Y. Times (June 3, 2016).  For a pessimistic view on American institutions in this 
moment, see George Packer, Will Our Democratic Institutions Contain Trump? All the Pieces Are in Place 
for the Abuse of Power, and It Could Happen Quickly, The New Yorker (Nov. 21, 2016) (“The 
democratic institutions that held Nixon to account have lost their strength since the nineteen-
seventies—eroded from within by poor leaders and loss of nerve, undermined from without by 
popular distrust.”). 
6  Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, 113 J. Pol. Econ. 949, 988 (2005) 
(showing property rights institutions “have a major influence on long-run economic growth”); 
Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 Geo. L.J. 1457, 1525–27 (2005) (finding strong correlation between 
the rule of law and economic growth); Martin Leschke, Constitutional Choice and Prosperity: A Factor 
Analysis, 11 Const. Pol. Econ. 265 (2000) (analyzing cross-country data and showing rule of law 
promoted economic growth). 
7  See, e.g., Craig Anthony Arnold, Fourth-Generation Environmental Law: Integrationist and 
Multimodal, 35 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 771, 792 (2011) (describing the field of 
environmental law “as a complex and adaptive institutional system within the larger law-and-
society system” that “continues to evolve, not settling on some optimal equilibrium, but instead 
adapting to the many forces and conditions that shape it”). 
8  See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Thank You for Being Late: An Optimist’s Guide to 
Thriving in the Age of Accelerations 3–4 (2016) (describing the pace of change in 
contemporary America and dubbing this period the “Age of Accelerations”). 
9  See generally Richard H. Pildes, Institutional Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and Public 
Law, 2013 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 (2013) (emphasizing the importance of institutional analysis and arguing 
for a balance between institutional realism and institutional formalism in public law adjudication 
to achieve appropriate outcomes). 
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choose between institutions when seeking to pursue policy goals.10  Despite its 
longstanding use, I argue that Komesar’s approach is narrow and limited.  Notably, 
it only identifies a small category of institutions—the public sector, the private 
sector, and the courts—from which to choose and fails to conduct a more nuanced 
analysis of available institutions.11  The need to dig deeper is not unique to an 
analysis of institutions.  For example, there is a growing body of scholarship 
recognizing the need to adapt our views of federalism towards a more nuanced 
understanding of the interactions between different levels of government,12 what 
Dean Heather Gerken calls “federalism all the way down.”13  The time is right to 
adopt a similar view of institutions: an institutional analysis all the way down. 
Indeed, a monolithic, or one-dimensional, view of institutions would seem 
inadequate for confronting the task of addressing the large, complex problems of 
our time.  A simple view of institutions and institutional processes leaves much to 
be desired in terms of addressing these problems, as they arise in different contexts 
and at different times.  For example, comparative institutional analysis has been 
used to argue that a private property regime is best suited to achieve the goals of 
ensuring proper stewardship of property and resource allocation efficiency.14  Yet 
                                                                    
10  Evidence of Komesar’s prominence in and importance to the discipline of comparative 
institutional analysis is all around, perhaps seen best in the dedication of a symposium and issue 
of the Wisconsin Law Review that enlisted contributions from diverse subfields such as statutory 
interpretation, cybersecurity, and administrative law, among others, to address the lasting 
impact of Komesar’s work.  See Symposium Issue—Thirty Years of Comparative Institutional 
Analysis: A Celebration of Neil Komesar, 2013 Wis. L. Rev. 2 (2013), http://wisconsinlawreview.org
/volume-2013-no-2/. 
11  Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, 
Economics, and Public Policy 4–9 (1994) [hereinafter Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives]. 
12  See, e.g., David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 487, 491 (1999) (arguing local governments are often in a better position than state or 
federal governments for resolving critical disputes over the “most contentious of public 
questions”); Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in 
Contemporary Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1303, 1335–49 (1994) (arguing for a formal role for states 
in the federal system); Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an 
Era of State Sovereignty, 63 Va. L. Rev. 959, 1010–11 (2007) (arguing that the “normative case for 
devolutionary federalism leads to a defense of federal authority to empower local governments”).  
On the effects of a decentralized federalism on local power, see Richard Schragger, City 
Power: Urban Governance in a Global Age 78–102 (2016). 
13  Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 9–10 (2010). 
14  Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347 (1967) (arguing 
transaction costs associated with managing communal property require private property 
regime). 
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as the work of Elinor Ostrom shows, there are times when non-market 
arrangements, particularly at the local level, are in a better position to regulate 
common-pool resources in certain circumstances.15  Similarly, as the American 
public and its founders discovered, the weak institutional arrangements preferred 
under the Articles of Confederation were ill-equipped to provide for the common 
defense of the new nation.16  The Hoover Administration struggled to address the 
economic crisis of the Great Depression using the pre-1929 institutional preferences 
of strong state and local governments, a comparatively weak federal government, 
and a large private sector.17  In both examples, the institutions of our federal 
government evolved in response to a crisis.18  The historical, one-dimensional 
approach to comparative institutional analysis overlooks the temporal and 
contextual effects on an institution’s ability to facilitate collective-action objectives.  
As broad-scale problems and our understanding of institutions evolve, a one-
dimensional view of institutions must evolve as well. 
This Article introduces what I call a “multi-dimensional” approach to 
comparing institutions, one that, I argue, offers a richer understanding of the 
different facets of institutions: how they operate in relation to each other, how they 
operate in opposition to each other, and how they operate over time.  By developing 
a better and more nuanced understanding of how institutions function, we can 
ensure that the proper institution is deployed in its proper context and at the proper 
time to achieve desired policy goals.  In this way, my multi-dimensional approach 
to comparative institutional analysis flows from a “New Legal Realist” view of 
institutions that engages with how institutions function in the real world in light of 
the new legal empiricism.19 
                                                                    
15  Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action 89–102 (James E. Alt & Douglass C. North eds., reprt. 2002) (1990) (describing 
the types of institutional features of common-pool resource arrangements that can lead to 
successful outcomes in terms of community resource management). 
16  Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 
8, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 115, 117 (2010) (describing efforts to create a Constitution as a means of 
addressing collective action problems the Articles of Confederation could not solve). 
17  See David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and 
War, 1929–1945 50–60 (1999). 
18  See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 16 (describing the emergence of the federalist constitution); 
Kennedy, supra note 17 (describing the expansion of the federal government in response to the 
Great Depression). 
19  As Gregory Shaffer argues: “Komesar’s framework needs to be complemented by an 
empirically grounded, new legal realist approach regarding how law is translated in different 
institutional contexts.  In this way, new analytics can emerge that will update and inform 
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To pursue these ends, this Article proceeds as follows.  Part I offers a common 
vocabulary for discussing institutions and introduces the discipline of comparative 
institutional analysis.  Part II offers a case study of the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA20 as a lens through which to view 
comparative institutional analysis in a new, multi-dimensional light.  The case 
serves as an instructive example of a multi-dimensional approach, clearly framing 
the issues as institutional inquiries.  Part III identifies and explains the seven 
different dimensions of institutions this review of Massachusetts v. EPA surfaces.  
Lastly, Part IV explores the implications a multi-dimensional approach has on our 
understanding of institutions and comparative institutional analysis itself. 
But before I embark on this endeavor, let me clarify what this Article does not 
attempt to do.  This Article embraces the complexity of how institutions and 
institutional systems function, but it does not use comparative institutional 
analysis to advance social change of a particular political bent or promote a specific 
policy goal.  I will leave that to future work if this approach proves useful and 
illuminative.   
I .  I NS T I T UT I ONS  I N T HE OR Y  
So what does one mean when one talks about the importance of institutions?  
Indeed, what are institutions and how do they function?  How do they sustain a 
society, provide norms for behavior, and offer a legal structure to the order of 
human affairs?  How do they arise, operate, and evolve over time?  How do they 
relate to each other and to public policies and societal goals?  Are certain institutions 
in a better position to achieve such goals as preserving the rule of law, protecting 
civil and political rights, or developing resiliency in the face of climate change?  This 
intersection between policy preferences and institutions is central to the discipline 
known as comparative institutional analysis, which this Article proudly and humbly 
embraces as its foundation.21  However, I will show that as the scale and complexity 
                                                                    
comparative institutional analysis in a dynamically changing world.”  Gregory Shaffer, 
Comparative Institutional Analysis and a New Legal Realism, 2013 Wis. L. Rev. 607, 628 (2013).  For a 
discussion of the similarities and differences between the “New Legal Realism” and comparative 
institutional analysis, see Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a 
New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 61, 85–88 (2009).  On the trend 
toward empiricism in law, see Mark C. Suchman & Elizabeth Mertz, Toward a New Legal 
Empiricism: Empirical Legal Studies and New Legal Realism, 6 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 555, 557–59 
(2010). 
20  549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
21  Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 11, at 4–5. 
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of problems inevitably evolve, historical comparative institutional analysis can also 
evolve as the lens for assessing the proper role of institutions in achieving policy 
goals.  Traditionally, the main focus of that assessment is captured in the decisions 
over who decides a particular policy question and who decides who decides.22  I 
argue that such a limited focus must evolve and expand to consider a variety of 
institutional dimensions in order to render the analysis sufficiently actionable. 
But first, I will develop a definitional baseline to set the stage for the discussions 
that follow.  In one common usage of the term “institution,” an institution is an 
organization or a class of organizations.23  I can refer to the law school at which I 
teach as an institution.  One might also speak of law schools in general as 
institutions (plural) or as a single institution, e.g., “law schools, as an institution, 
must instill their students with appropriate professional values to confront a 
complex world.”  Other uses of the term institution abound,24 the detailed 
exploration of which is beyond the scope of this Article and could take at least a full 
article to address.25 
There are at least three common uses of the term institution in the context of 
conducting comparative institutional analysis.  First, and for our purposes, an 
institution can be used to describe stand-alone organizations or a particular entity 
                                                                    
22  Id. at 3. 
23  For example, one such definition, from Webster’s Dictionary, describes an institution as “an 
established organization or corporation (such as a bank or university) especially of a public 
character.”  Institution, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/institution [https://perma.cc/CM8D-8G9G] (last visited Oct. 5, 2018). 
24  When it comes to the functioning of the national government in the United States, one could 
easily concoct the following sentence and have the term institution mean something very 
different each time the term finds its way into the statement: “The Senate as an institution that 
protects the institution of collegiality among members will only be preserved if the institution of 
the filibuster is honored.”  Here we see three somewhat distinct notions and usages of the term.  
First, the idea that the “Senate is an institution” reflects the concept that it is a body or 
organization that has a role to play in our constitutional structure (dare I say an “institutional 
role” to even further complicate things?).  Collegiality is an informal behavioral norm that 
encourages certain types of conduct (again, using the adjectival form, it is an “institutional 
norm”—a norm that is found among actors within the institution).  Finally, some might see an 
institution as a formal rule or law that governs behavior, as in the case of the filibuster in different 
contexts, when it was embodied in the rules that govern Senate practices.  Thus, in this simple 
example, we see that the term institution can be used in many different ways, to mean different 
things, in different contexts. 
25  Indeed, one such very effective article-length attempt has been made to do just that: see 
generally Daniel H. Cole, The Varieties of Comparative Institutional Analysis, 2013 Wis. L. Rev. 383 
(2013). 
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like the U.S. Senate, a law school, a nonprofit organization, or a business.26  Second, 
as used by Professor Komesar,27 institutions may refer to what I call institutional 
systems.  These are the government, the market, and the courts, rather than a 
particular governmental body, business, or court.  Institutional systems, like solar 
systems, are settings in which smaller institutions—discrete organizations per the 
first definition—operate.  Third, while Douglass North describes institutions as 
“the rules of the game,”28  I reject this use as simply too far removed from the 
nuanced, multi-dimensional analysis that is required. 
For the purposes of this Article, I will use the term “norm” when I mean an 
informal rule or pattern of behavior,29 “law” when I mean a prescription formally 
passed by a legislative body,30 and “regulation” when such a prescription is adopted 
by a regulatory body.31  Finally, when I use phrases like “the Senate as an institution,” 
I am referring to the institution’s “institutional role”—the relative place it inhabits 
and the functions it fulfills within an institutional system.32 
With our definitional baseline established, we now turn to the discipline of 
comparative institutional analysis itself.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, in the face 
                                                                    
26  See Merriam-Webster, supra note 23. 
27  See Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 11, at 4–5. 
28  Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance 3 (James Alt & Douglass North eds., 27th prtg. 2009) (1990); see also Oliver E. 
Williamson, Why Law, Economics, and Organization?, 1 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 369, 385 (2005) 
(distinguishing between the “institutional environment” which are the “rules of the game” and the 
“institutions of governance” which are referred to as the “play of the game”). 
29  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 914 (1996) 
(defining norms as “social attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying what ought to be done 
and what ought not to be done”). 
30  See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 31–33 (1986) (discussing different views of the term 
“law”). 
31  Even these descriptions can sometimes become blurry in their interchangeable use in 
scholarship.  Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 11, at 31 (discussing the role of 
“regulations and rights” in the interplay between institutions). 
32  For any institution, understanding that institution’s institutional role requires one to take 
into account the norms, laws, and regulations that may encumber or shape the functions of that 
institution within the institutional system or systems within which it operates as well as its 
relationship to other institutions with which it comes into contact.  My own taxonomy of 
institutions might be somewhat different than the ways in which theorists from the New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) school might use the term and certainly different from the 
somewhat idiosyncratic view of Komesar.  I hope this approach is more workable and helps to 
offer a clearer way in which to view institutions.  For a somewhat different take on institutional 
definitions in comparative institutional analysis, see generally Cole, supra note 25. 
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of emerging fields of study such as law and economics33 and critical legal studies,34 
comparative institutional analysis arose as not only a critique of these other 
approaches to law, but also as a way to think about the pursuit of policy goals, i.e., 
as a process embedded within an institutional framework.35  When using this 
discipline, in order to make decisions about how best to achieve select policy goals, 
one had to compare various institutions to determine the proper institution for 
achieving those goals.36  While the intellectual forefather of this approach to 
institutional choice in the pursuit of policy goals is Ronald Coase, it is primarily 
through the work of Neil Komesar and his work’s progeny that the discipline of 
comparative institutional analysis emerged.37  Komesar urged a generation of 
scholars to think critically and seriously about the proper role of institutions in 
achieving policy goals, and his work has encouraged the comparative analysis of 
institutions and their role in managing property law regimes,38 pursuing 
environmental protection,39 promoting firearm regulation through the tort 
                                                                    
33  For an introduction to the law and economics approach, see generally Richard A. Posner, 
Economic Analysis of Law (9th ed. 2014). 
34  For an overview of critical legal studies scholarship, see generally Mark Kelman, A Guide to 
Critical Legal Studies (1987). 
35  Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 11, at 4–5.  For an intellectual history of the 
emergency of comparative institutional analysis alongside these other schools of thought, see 
generally Edward L. Rubin, Institutional Analysis and the New Legal Process, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 463 
(1995) (book review). 
36  Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 11, at 5–8. 
37  On the emergence of comparative institutional analysis from the work of Coase, see Joel P. 
Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of International Economic Organization: Toward 
Comparative Institutional Analysis, 17 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 470, 501–04 (1997). 
38  See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Sprawl’s Dynamics: A Comparative Institutional Analysis Critique, 35 
Wake Forest L. Rev. 509 (2000) (using comparative institutional analysis to discuss policies 
related to housing sprawl); Daniel H. Cole, Political Institutions, Judicial Review, and Private Property: 
A Comparative Institutional Analysis, 15 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 141 (2007) (applying comparative 
institutional analysis to property law). 
39  See, e.g., Jennifer M. Egan & Joshua M. Duke, Water Quality Conflict Resolution and Agricultural 
Discharges: Lessons from Waterkeeper v. Hudson, 39 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 533 (2015) 
(using comparative institutional analysis to assess best approaches to environmental policies in 
certain settings). 
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system,40 interacting with social movement theory,41 and ensuring the proper 
functioning of the courts.42 
The primary insight of Komesar’s theories is that when seeking policy goals, the 
appropriate method of analysis is not simply to identify a single institution that 
might carry out a policy in a given context, assess whether that particular 
institution, standing alone, is effective at achieving that goal, and accept or reject 
that institution based on that assessment.  Rather, for Komesar, the better approach 
is to determine which institution among a set of institutions is better equipped to 
deliver on that chosen policy outcome.43  For Komesar, an “institution” for 
comparative institutional purposes is either one of three options: the public sector 
(the government), the courts (the judiciary), or the private sector (the market).44  The 
pursuit of policy goals, and the choice of the institutions best suited to achieve those 
goals, then, comes down to a choice between these institutional processes and 
institutional systems, as I have called them.45  Komesar is critical of those who 
engage in what he refers to as “single institutional analysis,” which arises when one 
looks only at the value of one institution to achieve a given policy goal.46  Such an 
approach, he argues, fails to appreciate the value of comparing the functioning of 
multiple institutions in particular contexts to determine the institution best suited 
to meet the intended goals.47 
For example, Komesar asserts that courts and the adjudicative process have 
                                                                    
40  Timothy D. Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Comparative Institutional Analysis, 32 
Conn. L. Rev. 1247, 1248 (2000) (using comparative institutional analysis to argue that the tort 
system is an effective forum for the regulation of gun violence). 
41  Nancy J. Knauer, The Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships: Comparative Institutional Analysis, 
Contested Social Goals, and Strategic Institutional Choice, 28 U. Haw. L. Rev. 23 (2005) (assessing the 
value of comparative institutional analysis in relation to social movement theory in the context of 
the campaign for marriage equality). 
42  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative Institutional 
Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes, 2013 Wis. L. Rev. 411 
(2013) (applying comparative institutional analysis to administrative law and statutory 
interpretation). 
43  Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 11, at 4–5. 
44  Id. at 9. 
45  Id. at 4–9.  The use of the term institution in this setting in this way may be unique to 
Komesar’s approach and those who follow Komesar in conducting traditional comparative 
institutional analysis.  It is by no means consistent with common usage to limit the term 
institution to refer simply to the political processes, the courts, or the market. 
46  Id. at 6. 
47  Id. at 4–7. 
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three distinct characteristics when compared to the institutions of the market and 
the political process: “higher threshold access costs, limited scale, and judicial 
independence.”48  On the first characteristic, these access costs are a function of a 
blend of norms and formal rules about who can come to court to resolve a dispute 
and when they can do so.49  As Komesar explains, “[s]tanding determines who can 
bring action based on a given wrong.  Choice of law determines which state’s law 
will be employed.  Justiciability and ripeness determine when wrongdoing can come 
to the courts.  The difficulty of understanding and meeting these requirements 
raises the cost of litigation.”50 
For Komesar, it is not enough to understand that these threshold barriers exist; 
rather, it is also necessary to understand that the courts’ threshold access costs are 
comparatively higher than those of the political process or the market.51  
Furthermore, he argues that the components of the judiciary’s limited access are a 
product of blended concerns about preserving the proper role of the courts based 
on our collective understanding of what that institutional role should be in the 
distinctively American system.52  In this system, courts are not supposed to be 
“super-legislatures.”53  Rather, as John Hart Ely describes, their role is to ensure that 
other branches of government are following the law and that private litigants have 
a forum in which to resolve their disputes peaceably.54  Interestingly, the judiciary 
is often criticized if it is perceived as lowering its comparatively high threshold 
access costs.  Failure to honor the norms and rules defining the types of disputes it 
should try to resolve, when it should try to resolve them, and the parties that can 
come before it to resolve them can threaten the courts’ legitimacy as an institution 
because of its particular institutional role.55 
The second and third characteristics identified by Komesar—limited scale and 
                                                                    
48  Id. at 123. 
49  Id. at 124–25. 
50  Id. at 126 (footnote omitted). 
51  Id. at 123. 
52  Id. at 123–54. 
53  James Michael Scheppele, Are We Turning Judges into Politicians, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1517, 1518 
(2005) (noting risks of turning courts into unaccountable “super legislatures,” displacing the 
proper role of the electorate and other branches of government). 
54  For criticism of judges that promote their own values over more carefully circumscribed 
principles, see John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 43–71 (1980). 
55  See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 51–71 (1961) 
(discussing different mechanisms by which courts maintain their legitimacy by only resolving 
disputes perceived as properly within their institutional power to resolve). 
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judicial independence—operate in a similar manner to the first.  The scope of 
judicial inquiry and the relief courts can offer litigants reflect our sense of the 
proper role of the judiciary in resolving disputes, the types of disputes it can resolve, 
and its ability to hold government and private actors accountable where 
appropriate.56  Likewise, judicial independence is an institutional norm—what we 
expect of individual judges in their conduct—and reflects an institutional imperative 
or role—what we expect of courts as institutions.57 
Komesar uses the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in Boomer v. Atlantic 
Cement Co.58 to frame a discussion of goal-setting and comparative institutional 
analysis.59  In that case, residents of upstate New York sued a local cement plant that 
was emitting noxious fumes and sought an injunction to stop the plant’s 
emissions.60  The case, for Komesar, helps to illuminate the ability of one institution 
to achieve a policy goal where others are less equipped to do so.61  In Boomer, the key 
policy goal at issue was resource allocation efficiency.62  The court concluded that 
the economic value generated by the cement plant’s normal activities outweighed 
the loss of value to the small number of residents who initiated the action.63  
Consequently, instead of halting the operations of the plant, the court simply 
ordered the defendant to compensate the plaintiffs for the harms they were 
suffering as a result of the plant’s emissions.64 
According to Komesar, this outcome shows that the judiciary was in a better 
position relative to the other institutional processes available to resolve the question 
of how to accomplish the goal of resource allocation efficiency effectively.65  Use of 
the market would have required protracted negotiations, compromising the speed 
and efficiency of the resolution.66  Similarly, the partiality of the political process 
could have hindered the fairness of the resolution and the efficiency of the resource 
                                                                    
56  Neil K. Komesar, Law’s Limits: The Rule of Law and the Supply of Demand and Rights 
159–60 (2001) [hereinafter Komesar, Law’s Limits]. 
57  Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 11, at 127–28. 
58  26 N.Y.2d 219 (1970). 
59  Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 11, at 14–28. 
60  26 N.Y.2d at 222. 
61  Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 11, at 15–16. 
62  Id. at 14–17. 
63  26 N.Y.2d at 223, 227–28. 
64  Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 11, at 15–16. 
65  See id. 
66  Id. at 21. 
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allocation if one party was able to exert political influence to capture a favorable 
outcome.67  Komesar thus concludes that neither alternative institutional process 
could have resolved the Boomer dispute in a manner that accomplished the goal of 
resource allocation efficiency as fittingly as the judiciary.68 
Of course, resource allocation efficiency is not the only possible goal that could 
have been at issue in Boomer.  One might have wanted to ensure some degree of air 
quality or that businesses should not be permitted to engage in their activities in an 
unfettered fashion.  However, Boomer was decided at a time—1970—when the 
nation’s awareness of the risks to the environment from unconstrained business 
practices was just emerging and federal intervention to curb environmental abuses 
was just beginning.69  Since then, our understanding of environmental and climate 
science has evolved considerably and our appreciation for the costs and benefits 
associated with environmental degradation has become more sophisticated.70  
Correspondingly, the role of political processes in resolving environmental 
dilemmas has grown.71  Given the growth in the scale and complexity of 
environmental problems facing the world, one must ask whether extant institutions 
have the capacity to address these problems today. 
Significantly, the capacity of Komesar’s institutions to function deteriorates as 
problems become larger and more complicated.  He argues that as numbers—the 
number of individuals involved in, associated with, or affected by a problem or 
situation—and complexity increase, the institutions asked to address that problem 
struggle to operate effectively.72  This does not negate the need to choose between 
the institutions Komesar has identified in making decisions regarding their 
effectiveness in a particular setting.  But one is likely to find that the institutional 
                                                                    
67  Id. at 26–27.  This tension also exposes what Komesar calls the potential majoritarian and 
minority biases present, at times, in different institutional systems.  Id. at 56–81. 
68  Id. at 21, 26–27. 
69  See Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory State, 92 Iowa L. 
Rev. 545, 566–77 (2007) (describing the relationship between the decision in Boomer v. Atlantic 
Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219 (1970), and the emergence of federal statutory and regulatory 
intervention in the environmental field). 
70  Over ten years ago, an editorial in the journal Science praised the emergence of a sophisticated 
understanding of climate science but lamented a failure on the part of the scientific community 
to communicate that information effectively to the broader populace.  See Donald Kennedy, 
Editorial, Climate Change and Climate Science, 304 Science 1565 (2004). 
71  See Paul S. Weiland, Unfunded Environmental Mandates: Causes, Burdens, and Benefits, 22 Harv. 
Envtl. L. Rev. 283, 286–96 (1998) (describing the growth of federal oversight over the 
environment). 
72  Komesar, Law’s Limits, supra note 56, at 159–60. 
U N D E R S T A N D I N G  I N S T I T U T I O N S  
15 
systems of the market, the courts, and the political processes are each in a weaker 
position to achieve contemporary policy objectives that involve a greater number of 
affected individuals and/or added complexity.73  As more individuals become 
involved in market transactions, transaction costs associated with obtaining 
information about all of them, reaching negotiated agreements between them, and 
monitoring compliance of those participants also increase.74  Lawsuits involving 
more parties and a wider range of issues become more complicated and costly to 
resolve.75  Political processes can become paralyzed when they attempt to meet the 
conflicting needs of a diverse electorate, which can lead to their capture by a 
powerful elite.76  Thus, the effectiveness of the Komesarian institutions at the heart 
of traditional comparative institutional analysis weakens when the number of 
individuals involved in a particular setting increases and the complexity of their 
problems grow.77 
This phenomenon—that institutional effectiveness deteriorates in the face of 
increasing numbers and complexity—does not, neither Komesar nor I argue, mean 
that we should abandon comparative institutional analysis.78  Rather, it means that 
such analysis just gets more difficult.79  Contemporary problems facing the world 
on a global scale, such as climate change, economic inequality, threats to the rule of 
law, and rapid technological change, are massive in terms of both the numbers of 
individuals they affect as well as their complexity.80  These problems are exactly the 
types of issues that make any form of comparative institutional analysis 
challenging.  Indeed, the world has changed dramatically since Coase identified the 
                                                                    
73  Id. 
74  Neil Komesar, The Logic of the Law and the Essence of Economics: Reflections on Forty Years in the 
Wilderness, 2013 Wis. L. Rev. 265, 299–301 (2013) [hereinafter Komesar, The Logic of the Law]. 
75  See generally Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 11, at 177–95. 
76  Komesar, Law’s Limits, supra note 56, at 116–22. 
77  Komesar, The Logic of the Law, supra note 74, at 300. 
78  Id. 
79  Id. 
80  See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to 
Liberate the Future, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1153, 1159–72 (2009) (describing the scope, scale, and risks 
associated with climate change).  See generally Acemoglu & Robinson, supra note 4 (describing 
the consequences of abandonment of the rule of law for institutional stability and economic 
health); Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society 
Endangers Our Future (2012) (describing the global scope, scale, and impact of economic 
inequality). 
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role transaction costs play in decision-making81 and Komesar argued for a 
comparative approach to institutions.82  Globalization, political strife, nationalism, 
nativism, the financial crisis of 2008, economic inequality, and technological 
change have threatened the stability of the world order as it has existed since the fall 
of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union.83  The Internet and mobile 
technologies have brought the world closer together in many respects,84 and yet a 
neo-nativism movement that resists globalization is threatening to create higher 
barriers to the flow of ideas and people.85  Global climate change is having 
significant impacts on the world and is one of the greatest threats to global stability 
and our collective ability to sustain a rapidly growing population base.86  The 
sharing economy has brought new modes of interacting to established and 
emerging economies alike, creating economic opportunity for millions and 
fostering a new relationship between producer and consumer, but also providing 
few worker protections to such producers.87  These phenomena demonstrate that 
                                                                    
81  R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386, 390–92 (1937). 
82  Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 11, at 7–9. 
83  For a discussion of some of these forces shaping the contemporary age, see, for example, 
Kevin Kelly, The Inevitable: Understanding the 12 Technological Forces That Will 
Shape Our Future 29–60 (2016) (describing machine learning and artificial intelligence); Alec 
Ross, The Industries of the Future 35–42 (2016) (discussing the impact of technology on 
employment prospects of various industries); Richard Susskind & Daniel Susskind, The 
Future of the Professions: How Technology Will Transform the Work of Human 
Experts 45–99 (2015) (discussing the role of technology on various professions, including the legal 
profession).  For a discussion of economic inequality as a force in politics and economics, see, for 
example, Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century 305–06 (Arthur Goldhammer 
trans., 2014) (discussing the interplay of technology, education, and inequality); Douglas 
Rushkoff, Throwing Rocks at the Google Bus: How Growth Became the Enemy of 
Prosperity 222–39 (2016) (describing ways technology can help combat economic inequality and 
foster sustainable prosperity). 
84  Thomas Friedman famously declared, “The World is Flat,” in light of globalization generally 
and the advent of the internet, but this was before mobile technologies advanced this 
phenomenon.  See Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-
First Century 9–11 (2005) (describing forces creating a “flat” world). 
85  For a discussion of the impact of the “Brexit” vote in Great Britain on immigration and 
commerce, see Charles Ries, Theresa May Invokes Article 50: On with the Smoke and Mirrors, 
Newsweek (Mar. 29, 2017, 9:00 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/theresa-may-invokes-article-
50-smoke-and-mirrors-574048 [archival unavailable]. 
86  See Elizabeth Kolbert, The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History 92–110 (2014) 
(describing the impact of climate change on the environment and human activity). 
87  For a discussion of the role of law in regulating the sharing economy, see Orly Lobel, The Law 
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the scale and complexity of the problems the world faces have only grown, in some 
cases exponentially.88  As Komesar’s work posits, our institutions (and institutional 
settings) tend to buckle as a result.89 
To avoid this buckling, I hope to show that we can try to deepen and evolve our 
understanding of institutions.  Komesar’s traditional approach to comparative 
institutional analysis applied in a contemporary setting has, to date, exhibited a 
similar shortcoming to those engaging in single institutional analysis: it has viewed 
institutions as “one-dimensional.”  To understand the ways in which institutions 
function, and to achieve desired policy goals and outcomes through such 
institutions, one must take, instead, a multi-dimensional approach to institutions, 
recognizing how they differ, are interdependent, evolve, and interact.90  To be fair 
to Komesar, at times he makes reference to a complex view of institutions.  For 
example, he discusses the role different levels of government might play in 
addressing a particular issue.91  He also  acknowledges that his theory of 
comparative institutional analysis was intended to be “as simple, accessible, and 
intuitively sensible as possible”92 and not to “present[] the last word on the topic.”93  
As a result, much of his work is devoted to conducting comparative institutional 
analysis through an assessment of the particular types of institutional process—the 
markets, political processes, and the courts—and their relative ability to address 
particular social policy goals.94  This approach leaves much work to do for those who 
would study institutions and their nuances, the ways in which they interact and 
collaborate and the ways in which they evolve over time.  And many have taken on 
                                                                    
of the Platform, 101 Minn. L. Rev. 87, 142–61 (2016). 
88  See generally Erik Brynjolfsson & Andrew McAfee, The Second Machine Age: Work, 
Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies (2014) (describing the impact 
of exponential and combinatorial computing power on life, work, and prosperity).  As Geoffrey 
West explains: “It is in the very nature of exponential expansion that the immediate future comes 
upon us increasingly more rapidly, potentially presenting us with unforeseen challenges whose 
threat we recognize only after it’s too late.”  Geoffrey West, Scale: The Universal Laws of 
Growth, Innovation, Sustainability, and the Pace of Life in Organisms, Cities, 
Economies, and Companies 9 (2017). 
89  Komesar, Law’s Limits, supra note 56, at 159–60 (discussing the impact of scale and 
complexity on institutions and comparative institutional analysis). 
90  This multi-dimensional approach is described infra Part III. 
91  Neil K. Komesar, The Perils of Pandora: Further Reflections on Institutional Choice, 22 L. & Soc. 
Inquiry 999, 1003 (1997) [hereinafter Komesar, Perils of Pandora] (citations omitted). 
92  Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 11, at 8. 
93  Komesar, Perils of Pandora, supra note 91, at 1008. 
94  Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 11, at 9–10. 
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the task of using comparative institutional analysis to study the best way to address 
particular policy goals in different settings.95  My purpose here is not to criticize this 
earlier, path-breaking work but to learn from it, build on it, and help it evolve to 
address the emerging challenges of the contemporary age. 
Indeed, as Komesar himself recognizes, as problems change and grow in size 
and complexity, it is difficult for institutions to respond to such changes 
effectively.96  Moreover, if one acknowledges that comparative institutional analysis 
is an effective tool for addressing social problems and pursuing policy goals, the 
shifting nature of problems—think of the growing threat to the planet posed by 
climate change—means not only that institutions themselves must change over 
time, but that our understanding of such institutions must also change.  Different 
markets, different political processes, and different courts might be better suited to 
further a particular policy goal and might be in a better position to do so at one point 
in time over another.  Moreover, as the scale and complexity of problems grow, so 
must policy responses to such problems evolve.  Thus, our understanding of 
institutions, in a more complex world with more complex problems and more 
complex solutions, should also grow and evolve. 
To further explore the multi-dimensional aspects of institutions, Part II 
examines the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,97 which arose 
out of emerging changes in the environment, evolution in the legal responses to 
such change, and the public and private reactions to both.98  There, several 
institutional actors brought a lawsuit against the federal government for its failure 
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.99  This discussion of the Court’s opinion helps 
to illuminate the multi-dimensional aspects of institutions.  In subsequent parts, I 
will first identify these different dimensions of contemporary institutions and then 
explore the critical implications of such a view of institutions in terms of their 
                                                                    
95  Comparative institutional analysis has been utilized in many contexts.  See, e.g., Larry I. 
Palmer, Patient Safety, Risk Reduction, and the Law, 36 Hous. L. Rev. 1609 (1999) (assessing the best 
liability rules in the provision of medical services to lower patient risk); Gregory Shaffer & Joel 
Trachtman, Interpretation and Institutional Choice at the WTO, 52 Va. J. Int’l L. 103 (2011) (analyzing 
international treaty interpretation and commercial dispute resolution at the level of international 
trade).  For my own effort to engage in comparative institutional analysis in an exploration of 
legal responses to the economic fallout from the financial crisis of 2008, see Raymond H. Brescia 
& Nicholas Martin, The Price of Crisis: Eminent Domain, Local Governments, and the Value of Underwater 
Mortgages, 24 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 1, 7–23 (2014). 
96  Komesar, Law’s Limits, supra note 56, at 159–60. 
97  549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
98  See id. 
99  Id. at 505. 
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problem-solving capacities in both law and policy.  
I I .  I NS T I T UT I ONS  AT  WOR K :  M A S S A C H U S E T T S  V .  E P A  AS  A L E NS  
T HR OUGH WHI C H T O E X P L OR E  T HE  DI ME NS I ONS  OF  I NS T I T UT I ONS  
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Massachusetts v. EPA reflects the 
comparative institutional approach, which, at a minimum, asks and attempts to 
answer the question: who decides who decides.  But the Court goes beyond this simple 
question, as my multi-dimensional approach advocates.  The complexity of the 
problem, the heterogeneity of the institutions and the institutional processes 
involved, and the dimension of time that the Court considered all point to and 
highlight the multi-dimensional aspect of institutions and comparative 
institutional analysis.  In this Part, I will first provide an overview of the Court’s 
majority opinion (with some references to the dissenting opinions at relevant 
points), and then discuss the opinions’ implications for comparative, multi-
dimensional institutional analysis. 
A. Background and the Court’s Holding 
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the City of New 
York, and several nonprofit plaintiffs sought judicial intervention to compel the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to assess whether it should issue 
regulations of greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act (CAA) relating to 
emissions from new motor vehicles.100  Under the CAA, the EPA can issue 
regulations concerning control of “air pollutants.”101  Because the EPA had decided 
not to make a determination as to whether greenhouse gases were air pollutants, 
which the plaintiffs challenged, the EPA, in turn, would not issue rules regulating 
such gases emitted by new motor vehicles.102  The plaintiffs argued that the statute 
required the EPA to determine that greenhouse gases were air pollutants and 
subject to EPA oversight.103  Once it made that determination, the plaintiffs argued, 
the EPA was also required to issue regulations that would cover these pollutants 
emanating from new motor vehicles.104  The plaintiffs alleged that the EPA’s failure 
                                                                    
100  Id. 
101  Id. at 528 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006)). 
102  Id. at 513–14 (citing Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 52,922, 52,930–33 (Sept. 8, 2003)). 
103  Id. at 510.  
104  Id. at 505 (arguing that the EPA “abdicated its responsibility under the Clean Air Act to 
regulate the emissions of four greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide”). 
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to take these steps contributed to global warming and caused significant harm to 
the plaintiffs by endangering the Massachusetts coastline, among other stated 
injuries.105 
One of the most important aspects of the ruling, which has implications for 
comparative institutional analysis and which I will discuss shortly, was the Court’s 
conclusion that Massachusetts had standing to challenge the EPA’s failure to 
address greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles.106  Justice Stevens’s 
majority opinion pointed out that Congress had explicitly authorized suits by 
litigants challenging the EPA’s failure to issue regulations under the CAA with 
respect to a particular pollutant.107  Quoting Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion 
from Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,108 the majority opinion held as follows: 
Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will 
give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.  In exercising this power, 
however, Congress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and 
relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.  We will not, therefore, 
entertain citizen suits to vindicate the public’s nonconcrete interest in the proper 
administration of the laws.109 
The majority recited the traditional elements of standing as articulated by the Court 
in Lujan as an actual or imminent injury, traceable to the defendant, and redressable 
by a court.110  But the Massachusetts v. EPA opinion also stressed the authority of 
Congress to, in essence, create standing for the violation of a procedural harm: 
[A] litigant to whom Congress has “accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete 
interests”—here, the right to challenge agency action unlawfully withheld—“can assert 
that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.”   
When a litigant is vested with a procedural right, that litigant has standing if there is 
some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to 
reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant.111 
In assessing Massachusetts’s standing, in addition to reviewing the procedural 
harm suffered by the denial of a procedural right (review of greenhouse gas 
                                                                    
105  Id. at 510, 515. 
106  Id. at 516. 
107  Id. 
108  Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 579 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
109  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 516–17 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment)). 
110  Id. at 517 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61). 
111  Id. at 517–18 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2006)). 
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emissions by the EPA), the majority found that the Commonwealth met the injury-
in-fact element in part because it owned “a substantial portion of the state’s coastal 
property.”112  As a result, it had “alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a 
landowner.”113 
With respect to the causation element of the standing inquiry, the Court noted 
that the EPA did not contest Massachusetts’s position that there is a causal 
connection between greenhouse gas emissions and global warming.114  Instead, the 
EPA argued that the relief the Commonwealth (and other plaintiffs) sought—
requiring the EPA to review such gases as pollutants and issue regulations as they 
relate to new vehicles’ emission of the gases—would only contribute 
“insignificantly” to the harms plaintiffs alleged.115  The Court disagreed with the 
EPA, concluding that a judicial remedy that might induce even “a small incremental 
step” towards mitigating a plaintiff’s injury satisfies the causation element of the 
standing inquiry.116 
Finally, in terms of satisfying the redressability prong of standing, the Court 
noted that even though other nations might increase their output of greenhouse 
gases, a “reduction in domestic emissions” of such gases “would slow the pace of 
global emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere.”117 
Once it decided that at least one plaintiff had standing, the majority addressed 
the merits of the collective plaintiffs’ contentions.118  The Court admitted that its 
scope of review in this setting was narrow119 and that “an agency has broad 
discretion to choose how best to marshal its limited resources and personnel to 
carry out its delegated responsibilities.”120  The majority nevertheless determined 
that it could, according to the Clean Air Act, reverse a decision of the Administrator 
of the EPA to refuse to engage in rulemaking if such action was “arbitrary, 
                                                                    
112  Id. at 522. 
113  Id. 
114  Id. at 523. 
115  Id. 
116  Id. at 524–25. 
117  Id. at 525–26. 
118  The Court assessed the standing of Massachusetts after finding that “[o]nly one of the 
petitioners needs to have standing to permit us to consider the petition for review.”  Id. at 518 
(citation omitted). 
119  Id. at 527. 
120  Id. 
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capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”121 
The statutory scheme at issue is complex, but, in the end, the inquiry can be 
synthesized into several critical components.  Initially, the Court had to decide if 
the statute required the Administrator to make a so-called “finding of 
endangerment” to identify whether an air pollutant—greenhouse gas emissions—
endangers public health or welfare.122  If it did, and if the EPA found that greenhouse 
gas emissions endanger public health or welfare, the Court then had to decide 
whether the Administrator was required to promulgate regulations regarding such 
emissions from new motor vehicles.123  In addition to these questions, a third would 
ultimately arise: if the EPA decided not to take action with respect to greenhouse 
gas emissions, would it need to articulate reasons, as provided for in the statutory 
scheme, to justify its decision not to do so.124 
The EPA argued that “Congress did not intend [the agency] to regulate 
substances that contribute to climate change” and thus carbon dioxide is not an air 
pollutant for the purposes of the statute rendering a “finding of endangerment” 
irrelevant.125  The majority rejected this view, holding that the statute was 
“unambiguous” in requiring the EPA to at least determine the potential harm to the 
environment from carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions.126 
In addition to its arguments on statutory interpretation, the EPA also made 
several policy arguments as to why it would be unwise to require it to assess the 
potential impacts of greenhouse gas emissions, including the assertion that to do 
so would infringe upon foreign policy judgments that are the clear province of the 
executive branch.127  The majority indicated that it had “neither the expertise nor the 
authority to evaluate these policy judgments,” but added that foreign policy 
judgments “have nothing to do with whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute 
to climate change.”128  Furthermore, the Court determined that such foreign policy 
implications did not “amount to a reasoned justification for declining to form a 
scientific judgment.”129 
                                                                    
121  Id. at 528 (citing Clean Air Act § 7607(d)(9)). 
122  Id. at 528, 533. 
123  Id. at 533. 
124  Id. at 533–35. 
125  Id. at 528. 
126  Id. at 529. 
127  Id. at 533. 
128  Id. 
129  Id. at 533–34. 
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The Court ultimately concluded as follows: 
[The] EPA has offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide whether 
greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change.  Its action was therefore 
“arbitrary, capricious, . . . or otherwise not in accordance with law.”  We need not and 
do not reach the question whether on remand [the] EPA must make an endangerment 
finding, or whether policy concerns can inform [the] EPA’s actions in the event that it 
makes such a finding.  We hold only that [the] EPA must ground its reasons for action 
or inaction in the statute.130 
Thus, the Court ruled for the plaintiffs by holding that the EPA was required to 
either assess the likely environmental impacts of greenhouse gas emissions from 
new motor vehicles as required by Congress or articulate a basis, firmly grounded 
in the statute, for refusing to do so.131  The majority opinion, as well as the dissents 
issued in response, help illuminate the institutional aspects of the decision. 
B. Massachusetts v. EPA and Institutions with Multiple Dimensions 
The decision in Massachusetts v. EPA has profound implications for our 
understanding of institutions and their multi-dimensional aspects.  The decision is 
certainly one that is, at its core, a conflict over who decides who decides.  By pursuing 
legal action and prosecuting the case through the lower courts, and, ultimately, the 
United States Supreme Court, the plaintiffs first chose from among the markets, 
political processes, and the courts to further their goals.  The plaintiffs, who 
themselves were a collection of diverse institutions, asked the Court to resolve a 
question of institutional decision-making.  The Supreme Court confirmed its 
decisional authority and concluded that an agency of the executive branch was 
obligated to make a decision regarding greenhouse gas emissions.132  But this 
question of who decides who decides was and is not so simple to answer.  There are 
many layers to the inquiry, just as there are many more layers and facets to the 
institutions and the institutional issues at play in Massachusetts v. EPA, which I will 
explore further in this Part. 
1. The Legal Issues 
Fundamentally, Massachusetts v. EPA is about when and under what 
circumstances a federal executive agency must make a decision.  But it also serves 
as a prime example of how to analyze the institutions that form the chain of who 
decides who decides.  Institutional concerns over the proper role of the courts in 
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reviewing agency decisions have led to the so-called Chevron doctrine, through 
which agencies are generally afforded a degree of discretion in carrying out their 
functions.133  But the courts also have another role to play in reviewing agency 
action: they must, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, “say what the law is.”134  
This emphatic prescription also empowered the Court to review and interpret the 
enactments of another institutional player—Congress—which had made an 
assessment of the proper role and function of the executive agency.135 
Congress’s enactment of the Clean Air Act created the obligation at issue in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, which the courts have recognized as a lawful exercise of 
Congressional power.136  That power granted the EPA the authority to make a 
decision, but the EPA’s decision, though insulated to a degree by Chevron deference, 
was not beyond judicial review.137  The majority concluded that Congress itself 
preserved the Court’s power for judicial review by providing that agency action 
under the Clean Air Act could not be arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.138 
In summary, the EPA had the authority to make a decision, which reflects that 
question so common to comparative institutional analysis: who decides.  In allocating 
that decisional authority upon the EPA, Congress was the institution who decides 
who decides.  The plaintiffs’ choice to leverage the judiciary took the chain one step 
further, essentially asking the Court to be the institution who decides who decides 
who decides.  In other words, the Court, acknowledging its deferential 
responsibility to the agency, stepped in to play the role of referee, ensuring that the 
EPA was acting in accordance with the authority that Congress had conferred on 
it.139  But between whom was this dispute, and why did the court have this role to 
play?  These questions lead to the next area of institutional analysis within the 
Massachusetts v. EPA decision. 
                                                                    
133  See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984) (describing 
the deference owed to administrative agencies by the courts). 
134  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
135  Id. at 138; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 528–32.  
136  For a discussion of the history and cases interpreting the Clean Air Act, see Jonathan Martel 
et al., Clean Air Regulation, in Global Climate Change and U.S. Law 134–52 (Michael B. Gerrard 
& Jody Freeman eds., 2d ed. 2014). 
137  549 U.S. at 527–28. 
138  Clean Air Act § 7607(d)(9); 549 U.S. at 528, 534. 
139  549 U.S. at 533–55.  This point is made quite succinctly in one of the closing lines of the 
majority opinion: “We hold only that [the] EPA must ground its reasons for action or inaction in 
the statute.”  Id. at 535. 
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2. The Parties 
Massachusetts v. EPA involved a number of different institutional actors, which 
complicates our understanding of institutional processes and institutional roles 
when conducting comparative institutional analysis if one assumes the limited view 
of institutions common in such analysis.  There were several different actors 
engaged on both sides of the dispute—most notably the EPA and the states that filed 
suit—residing within the Komesarian realm of the political process.140  In addition, 
several states intervened in the action in support of the EPA,141 and these political-
process entities were joined by several industry trade groups from the private 
sector.142  Several local governments and a host of nonprofit organizations also 
joined the litigation, teaming up with Massachusetts and other states to challenge 
the EPA.143  As a part of civil society, we may consider the nonprofits’ part of the 
                                                                    
140  Id. at 505. 
141  Id. 
142  Id. 
143  Id.; see also Final Brief for the Petitioners in Consolidated Cases at 5–10, Massachusetts v. EPA, 
415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Nos. 03-1361) (describing the organizational status of petitioners as 
follows: Sierra Club as a nonprofit corporation with more than 700,000 members nationwide 
organized under California law; Bluewater Network as a nonprofit corporation with no parent 
corporation; Center for Biological Diversity as a nonprofit corporation with no parent 
corporation; International Center for Technology Assessment (ICTA) as a nonprofit corporation; 
Center for Food Safety (CFS) as a national nonprofit membership organization that seeks to 
address the impacts of current industrial farming and food production systems on human health; 
Environmental Advocates of New York (EANY) as nonprofit membership organization that is the 
voice of New York State’s environmental community and devoted to the protection of New York’s 
wildlife, land, and people; Greenpeace as a nonprofit, nonviolent environmental membership 
organization whose mission is to raise public awareness of environmental problems and promote 
changes that are essential to a green and peaceful future; Conservation Law Foundation as a 
Massachusetts not-for-profit 501(c)(3) corporation that works to solve the environmental 
problems that threaten the people, natural resources, and communities of New England; 
Environmental Defense as a nonprofit corporation with no parent corporation and no publicly 
held company has a 10% or greater ownership interest in Environmental Defense; Friends of 
the Earth as a nonprofit corporation with no parent corporation and no publicly held company 
has a 10% or greater ownership interest in Friends of the Earth; National Environmental Trust 
(NET) as a nonprofit corporation with no parent corporation and no publicly held company has a 
10% or greater ownership interest in NET; Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) as a 
national nonprofit corporation with no parent corporation and no publicly held company has a 
10% or greater ownership interest in NRDC; Union of Concerned Scientists as a nonprofit 
corporation with no parent corporation and no publicly held company has a 10% or greater 
ownership interest in Union of Concerned Scientists; United States Public Interest Research 
Group (US PIRG) as a nonprofit corporation with no parent corporation and no publicly held 
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market process, Komesar’s second institutional system.144  
Stepping back, this case involved a group of states, local governments, and civil 
society organizations—political actors—joining together to challenge the actions of 
a federal agency—another political entity—which in turn had representatives of 
both the public and private sectors aligned with it.  This was not simply a challenge 
between institutional sectors, as Komesar’s one-dimensional comparative 
institutional analysis contemplates.  Rather, the alignment of various institutional 
parties on both sides of the dispute cuts across institutional systems with the parties 
then seeking the help of the third institutional sector—the courts—to resolve their 
dispute.  Furthermore, what was at stake was the Court’s interpretation of the intent 
of Congress in passing the Clean Air Act, which brings in another institutional actor 
from within the political process—the federal legislative branch. 
This institutional alignment has ramifications for traditional comparative 
institutional analysis.  First, the interests of actors within an institutional process 
do not always align, and those actors can find themselves on different sides of a 
dispute.  A one-dimensional analysis of the institutional process wholly ignores 
these heterogeneous interests.  Within the political process alone, we see a federal 
executive agency, the legislative branch, and state and local governments each 
attempting to influence the institutional setting and achieve their goals through the 
resolution of the dispute. 
Second, not only are there different institutional interests within a particular 
institutional process, it also includes different types of actors.  Returning to the 
political process, Massachusetts v. EPA involved federal, state, and local actors, each 
occupying their own place in our system of federalism and attempting to optimize 
their institutional roles.145  Similarly, the market is not really one, monolithic 
institution either, as private sector trade associations and nonprofit organizations 
found themselves on either side of the dispute.146 
The blurring of the lines between institutional systems reveals the multi-
dimensional character of these institutions in the circumstances surrounding the 
                                                                    
company has a 10% or greater ownership interest in US PIRG, and is dedicated to delivering 
persistent, result-oriented public interest activism that protects our environment, encourages a 
fair, sustainable economy, and fosters responsive, democratic government). 
144  For a discussion of the traditional comparative institutional view of the market and civil 
society, see Rubin, supra note 35, at 475–77.  For a discussion of the debate over the scope of civil 
society, see Laura Pedraza-Fariña, Conceptions of Civil Society in International Lawmaking and 
Implementation: A Theoretical Framework, 34 Mich. J. Int’l L. 605, 607–08 (2013) (citations omitted). 
145  See 549 U.S. at 505. 
146  See sources cited supra note 143. 
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Massachusetts v. EPA case, making traditional comparative institutional analysis 
challenging.  It is not enough to say that a single institutional system is best suited 
to resolve the dispute when there are different actors with different powers, roles, 
and interests emerging from within that system.  Actors from within different 
institutional systems all have a role to play—litigators, referees, national regulators, 
protectors of state interests, lawmakers, environmental advocates, etc.—in the 
resolution of the dispute, each trying to attain its own particular policy goals.  It is 
not simply a question of asking which institutional system is the one to decide, 
given the specific context, and which institutional actor within that system makes 
that decision.  There is no meaningful single answer when actors within each 
institutional system vary, have different interests, and are not limited to working 
collaboratively or in an adversarial fashion.  Instead, a realistic understanding of 
the richness of the institutions within and across different institutional systems 
reveals a spectrum of institutional dimensions and the need to consider them when 
conducting comparative institutional analysis. 
3. The Procedural Posture 
The procedural posture of Massachusetts v. EPA also highlights dimensional 
insights into the functioning of institutions, reinforcing the need for comparative 
institutional analysis to evolve beyond its traditional approach.  As described above, 
Massachusetts v. EPA is a classic case about who decides who decides.  The plaintiffs 
were not really seeking a court order on the underlying substance of the dispute, 
i.e., how and in what ways the EPA should regulate greenhouse gas emissions from 
new motor vehicles manufactured in the U.S.  Instead, the plaintiffs sought judicial 
relief that would direct the EPA to follow Congressional directives to assess such 
emissions for their impact on the environment.147  Additionally, the procedural 
intervention of institutions from both the public and private institutional systems 
substantially expanded the dimensional web from which the Court was asked to 
untangle the litigants and the issues.  In the end, the Court held that the EPA’s 
decision not to act and its reasons given for not acting were contrary to its statutory 
obligations under the Clean Air Act.148  Even after recognizing that the judiciary’s 
institutional role is limited by the concept of general deference to agencies, the 
Court nonetheless stepped in to serve as an institutional referee over the conflict.149  
As this discussion and those that follow show, not only is Massachusetts v. EPA a 
classic case about who decides who decides, it is a seminal case advocating for a 
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multi-dimensional comparative institutional analysis that incorporates a 
nuanced—and more meaningful—understanding of our institutions. 
4. Standing 
The majority’s noteworthy finding that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
and the other plaintiffs, had standing to sue goes to the core of the Court’s multi-
dimensional evaluation of the institutions involved in the case.  Instead of 
answering who decides who decides, determinations of standing answer the question 
of who gets to call the question, so to speak.  That is, an analysis of standing in the 
context of institutional plaintiffs evaluates whether a particular institutional actor 
or group of actors can initiate the adjudicatory dispute resolution process in an 
effort to achieve their desired goals.150 
Analyzing whether a plaintiff has standing invites, if not outright requires, a 
comparative institutional analysis.  Standing asks whether a particular actor can 
invoke the court’s jurisdiction based on an understanding of the types of actors who 
can do so and the types of conflicts the courts are empowered to resolve.151  When 
institutional parties seek to invoke the court’s jurisdiction, standing requires the 
court to understand their nature and assess whether they have a sufficient stake in 
the outcome such that they will pursue their cases with vigor.152  Just as results from 
a comparative institutional analysis are goal- or context-dependent, the standing 
inquiry is claim-specific, evaluating how the nature of the conflict relates to the 
institutional capacity of the courts.153 
Moreover, standing—and particularly its redressability element—essentially 
starts down the path of determining whether the court system is best suited to 
achieve a plaintiff’s goals by asking if and how the court can help resolve the 
plaintiff’s problem.  In this way, the doctrine effectively asks whether there is a 
comparatively better setting for the conflict, not unlike its close cousin, the political 
                                                                    
150  For an exploration of some of the institutional aspects of the standing doctrine, see Antonin 
Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. 
Rev. 881, 894–97 (1983). 
151  For a discussion of standing in the context of enforcing statutory rights and the relationship 
between the litigant, the harm, and the right allegedly violated, see William A. Fletcher, The 
Structure of Standing 98 Yale L.J. 221, 265–66 (1988). 
152  See, e.g., Washington Util. and Transp. Comm’n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 1975) 
(holding the alleged injury to the plaintiff “gives specificity and concreteness to the controversy 
and assures its presentation with adversarial vigor”). 
153  Erik R. Zimmerman, Supplemental Standing for Severability, 109 Nw. U. L. Rev. 285, 312–16 
(2015) (describing the Supreme Court’s recent standing jurisprudence as recognizing a claim-
specific approach to the standing inquiry). 
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question doctrine.154  The standing analysis often asks whether the parties and the 
dispute are better left to other institutional settings, like the halls of Congress or the 
ballot box, to decide.155  These functions of the standing inquiry demonstrate that it 
is, in many respects, a doctrine with important institutional aspects.  At its core, 
standing assesses the characteristics of the parties and the dispute to determine 
whether the courts are the appropriate institutional system in which to resolve that 
dispute between those parties. 
In many ways, the standing analysis itself is like a comparative institutional 
analysis.  It protects the judiciary’s institutional role—particularly, though not 
exclusively, at the federal level—by serving as a means of identifying real “cases and 
controversies.”156  The concept of standing reveals many societal norms that shape 
our views on the role of courts, including the need for those who are harmed to 
speak up and the desire to avoid court-issued advisory opinions.157  Case law 
overwhelmingly supports this notion of the standing doctrine’s importance in 
defining and maintaining the scope of the courts’ institutional role and in providing 
an important check on judicial activism.158  The dispute at the heart of Massachusetts 
v. EPA provides a prime example of how multi-dimensional institutional 
characteristics are revealed by and through the standing doctrine. 
The standing inquiry in Massachusetts v. EPA came down to three critical 
questions, all of which inform the evolution of comparative institutional analysis.  
First, can Congress create procedural harms the violation of which create 
standing?159  Second, can states bring suit in their parens patriae capacity against 
                                                                    
154  For a discussion of the role of comparative institutional analysis in determining judicial 
competency to resolve different disputes, see Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, 
Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1733, 1822–27 (2005). 
155  For the ways in which standing analysis often incorporates comparative institutional 
concepts, see Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1371, 1509–14 (1988). 
156  For the connection between the cases and controversies requirement in Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution and the standing doctrine, see, for example, Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. 
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151–52 (1970) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968)) and Scalia, supra 
note 150, at 882. 
157  Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 
464, 472 (1982). 
158  See sources cited supra note 156 and accompanying text.  For a critique of the cases and 
controversies “approach” to standing, see generally Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The 
Standing Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 169 (2012). 
159  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519–20 (2007). 
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the federal government?160  And third, can states claim harm to their proprietary 
interest as landowners in order to establish standing?161  I will address each of these 
questions in turn.  I will then discuss Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion on 
the topic of the Commonwealth’s standing, since it speaks directly to some of the 
critical institutional ramifications of the majority opinion and reveals the tensions 
within the Court regarding the institutional questions standing disputes often 
produce. 
Can Congress create procedural harms?  As described above, the majority opinion 
in Massachusetts v. EPA adopted language from Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in 
Lujan,162 in which he articulated the position that “Congress has the power to define 
injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy 
where none existed before.”163  However, Congress must, in doing so, “identify the 
injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to 
bring suit.”164  Therefore, the Court decided that Congress can step in and, in a way, 
create standing where it did not exist before,165 but only within the bounds of the 
Constitution’s “cases and controversies” requirement, which, many argue, is the 
original source of the standing doctrine itself.166  In doing so, the Court recognized 
that the legislature has an institutional role to play in creating a platform for the 
courts to resolve particular kinds of disputes.  Importantly, however, the Court was 
cognizant of preserving the societal values that shape its own institutional role by 
maintaining the requirement that some concrete and cognizable interest be at stake 
and reiterating that courts still cannot “entertain citizen suits to vindicate the 
public’s non-concrete interest in the proper administration of the laws.”167 
                                                                    
160  Id. at 520 n.17. 
161  Id. at 520–22. 
162  Id. at 517 (citation omitted).  The recognition of Congress’s power to create procedural harms 
was not relegated to the Kennedy concurrence in Lujan.  The majority opinion, penned by Justice 
Scalia, recognizes such procedural harms when they are coupled with traditional injuries.  Lujan 
v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992) (“There is this much truth to the assertion that 
‘procedural rights’ are special: The person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his 
concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for 
redressability and immediacy.”). 
163  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 516 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
164  Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580). 
165  Id. at 516 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580). 
166  See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151–52 (1970) (citation omitted). 
167  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 516–17 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring 
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Can states sue the federal government in their parens patriae capacity?  Another 
institutional question at the heart of the Massachusetts v. EPA standing analysis is 
the issue of whether states, in their parens patriae capacity, have the power to sue 
the federal government.168  In 1923, the Supreme Court issued two companion cases, 
Commonwealth v. Mellon and Frothingham v. Mellon,169 in which it rejected actions by 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and one of its residents challenging a federal 
statutory scheme to promote childhood and maternal health through federal 
expenditures administered by state actors.170  The Commonwealth sued the federal 
government in its parens patriae capacity, alleging the federal government had 
overstepped its authority and encroached upon the Commonwealth’s duty to 
safeguard the health and wellbeing of its own citizens.171  The Court held that the 
Commonwealth could not invoke its parens patriae authority to “institute judicial 
proceedings to protect citizens of the United States from the operation of the 
statutes thereof.”172  The Court explained that it is the federal government that can 
vindicate the rights of the citizens to the federal constitutional protections, not the 
states.173 
Given this precedent, it seemed unlikely that the state plaintiffs in Massachusetts 
v. EPA could pursue their action in their parens patriae capacity.  However, the 
majority relied on additional precedent, most notably the Court’s decision in Georgia 
v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,174 to avoid foreclosing the ability of Massachusetts to 
have standing in its parens patriae capacity.175  The Court cited Georgia v. 
                                                                    
in part and concurring in the judgment)).  In some ways, these discussions help to identify some 
of what Komesar calls the high threshold costs of litigation and access to the courts.  Komesar, 
Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 11, at 123. 
168  According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the term “parens patriae” means “parent of the 
country” (5th ed. 1979) and was first recognized by the Supreme Court as a basis upon which a 
state could bring suits to protect the rights and interests of its citizens in 1900.  See Louisiana v. 
Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900). 
169  262 U.S. 447 (1923) (treating both plaintiffs as bringing the same claim against the Maternity 
Act and addressing the standing analysis for each of the claims in one opinion). 
170  Id. at 478–80. 
171  Id.; see also James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why 
They Do It 279 (1989) (describing the Frothingham case). 
172  Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485. 
173  Id. (citation omitted).  In some ways, the Court’s parsing of the different powers of federal 
and state governments in terms of parens patriae standing is another example of the vertical 
heterogeneity present within institutional systems. 
174  324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945). 
175  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 n.17 (2007). 
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Pennsylvania Railroad Co. to establish a distinction between attempting to shield a 
state’s citizens from the operation of federal statutes, which is not permitted, and 
“allowing a State to assert its rights under federal law (which it has standing to 
do).”176  Employing this distinction, the Court explained that Massachusetts did not 
“dispute that the Clean Air Act applies to its citizens; it rather [sought] to assert its 
rights under the Act.”177  And what rights were those?   The Court seems to indicate 
that they are the Commonwealth’s interest in protecting its own “earth and air” by 
referring to its decision in Nebraska v. Wyoming,178 in which it upheld a state’s cross-
claim against the federal government asserting quasi-sovereign interests in such 
assets.179 
This aspect of the opinion is, in many ways, an assessment of the institutional 
characteristics of state and federal governments and the interactions between 
them.  It clarified that states have institutional interests in vindicating their own 
rights when threatened by the federal government, even when those rights 
implicate federal law.180  While states also have an interest in protecting their 
citizens, the opinion reaffirmed that they cannot shield their citizens from the 
operation of federal law or vindicate their citizens’ federal rights against the federal 
government.181  The discussion of parens patriae capacity helps us to understand 
these political-process institutions at a more nuanced level.  The Court’s dissection 
of different the institutional goals of the state government plaintiffs and their 
relation to the standing inquiry illuminates the drawbacks of one-dimensional 
comparative institutional analysis. 
In answering the final critical question under the standing analysis, the Court’s 
opinion is a little murky in describing the harm at stake and the ability of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts to bring suit to prevent that harm, given its 
institutional role.  Notwithstanding the murkiness, it is apparent that the 
Commonwealth had standing based on its institutional position as a sovereign 
landowner and the institutional role it played in vindicating its interests as such, 
particularly in relation to the federal government. 
Does the Commonwealth’s landowner status affect standing?  An essential fact in the 
determination of whether the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had suffered an 
injury-in-fact sufficient to give rise to its standing to sue the EPA was its role as a 
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landowner.182  The Court found that the Commonwealth had “alleged a 
particularized injury in its capacity as a landowner” by arguing that its coastal 
property was at risk due to climate change.183  The Court held that Massachusetts’s 
status as a landowner coupled with its status as a sovereign entity within the 
nation’s federal system “only reinforce[d] the conclusion that [the State’s] stake in 
the outcome of this case [was] sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise of 
federal judicial power.”184  By combining Massachusetts’s interests as a landowner 
and sovereign, the Court also determined that the Commonwealth was entitled to 
“special solicitude.”185  As such, it had an “independent interest ‘in all the earth and 
air within its domain,’”186 and its desire to preserve its “sovereign territory” would 
“support[] federal jurisdiction.”187  While the Court concluded that the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts “satisfied the most demanding standards of the 
adversarial process”188 even after stating it was entitled to some “special 
solicitude,”189 it never explained whether such solicitude—or Massachusetts’s 
status as a landowner—was determinative in satisfying these high standards.190  
The majority opinion leaves things unclear as to whether it was the finding of 
“special solicitude,” the Commonwealth’s appearance as a more traditional litigant 
seeking to vindicate its property interests, or the combination of its landowning and 
sovereign institutional characteristics that gave rise to the Commonwealth’s 
standing.191 
Chief Justice Robert’s dissent.  Chief Justice Roberts, writing for himself and 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, took issue with the majority’s opinion on 
standing, utilizing a clear-cut, who-decides-who-decides approach to the analysis.  
The dissent stated: “This Court’s standing jurisprudence simply recognizes that 
redress of grievances of the sort at issue here ‘is the function of Congress and the 
Executive,’ not the federal courts.”192  Chief Justice Roberts rejected the “special 
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solicitude” approach to state government standing, asserting that it should be 
harder, not easier, for a state to bring an action against the federal government in 
its parens patriae capacity for the vindication of federal rights.193 
Though the dissent expressed skepticism of Massachusetts’s claimed injury, it 
saved its most significant criticisms for the causation and redressability elements 
of the standing analysis.  These criticisms were rooted in the opinion’s focus on the 
fact that projected greenhouse gas emissions from new vehicles in the U.S. 
amounted to only a fraction of 4% of the total global greenhouse gas emissions.194  
With respect to causation, the dissent maintained that any loss of Massachusetts’s 
coastal land could not be traced to the EPA’s inaction in regulating that “fractional 
amount of global emissions.”195  The dissent ultimately concluded that the 
connection between the injury and its cause was “far too speculative.”196  Chief 
Justice Roberts found the redressability element to be “even more problematic,”197 
given that most greenhouse gas emissions are emitted from sources throughout the 
world.198  He admonished the majority for “never explain[ing] why [any reduction 
of emissions from new vehicles in the U.S.] makes it likely that the injury in fact—
the loss of land—will be redressed” through judicial intervention.199 
The majority opinion and the Chief Justice’s dissent arrive at very different 
conclusions with regard to the question who decides who decides.  Such drastic 
differences in their interpretations of what the federal courts’ institutional role 
should be in this case exemplifies the value of employing a multi-dimensional 
approach to comparative institutional analysis. 
5. The Merits of Massachusetts v. EPA 
To flesh out the institutional aspects of the merits of the majority opinion, I turn 
to the dissenting opinion filed by Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Thomas and Alito.  This separate dissenting opinion left the criticism of the 
standing issue to Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent and attacked the merits of the 
majority opinion, that is, the ruling that the EPA’s decision not to assess greenhouse 
gas emissions from new motor vehicles was not warranted under the statute.200  
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Scalia framed the institutional issues succinctly as follows: 
This is a straightforward administrative-law case, in which Congress has passed a 
malleable statute giving broad discretion, not to us but to an executive agency.  No 
matter how important the underlying policy issues at stake, this Court has no business 
substituting its own desired outcome for the reasoned judgment of the responsible 
agency.201 
In many ways, this passage highlights the cross-cutting institutional issues at 
the heart of the Court’s holding on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims.  Again, we see 
the justices clearly engaging with the question of who decides who decides.  For these 
dissenters, Congress had entered into the realm of environmental protection by 
authorizing an agency of the executive branch to assess, first, whether it needed to 
regulate in a particular context and, second, whether it was appropriate to issue 
such regulations.202 
While it is hard to argue with the dissenters’ point that the Clean Air Act 
provided the EPA with a great deal of decision-making discretion, the statute is not 
unlimitedly “malleable.”203  Importantly, as the majority opinion discussed, 
Congress restricted the EPA’s discretion by stating that the agency’s decisions 
cannot be arbitrary, capricious, or in violation of the law.204  Before analyzing the 
parties’ decision to engage the courts, it is worth noting that another institutional 
actor—Congress—in another institutional system—the political process—could 
have stepped in to police those boundaries and place restrictions on the EPA’s 
decision-making power.  For example, Congress could oversee the EPA’s work and 
tighten restrictions on its discretion by providing the agency with more specific 
guidance on when it is obligated to contemplate and promulgate regulations.  Such 
actions are consistent with Congress’s institutional role as a lawmaker, which at its 
core involves defining acceptable behavior, even for other branches of government. 
Absent additional guidance from Congress on the merits of the EPA’s inaction, 
the courts, when prompted by an appropriate party have an institutional role to play 
in policing agency misconduct.  Both the majority opinion and Justice Scalia’s 
dissent agree that the Court’s institutional role is shaped, among other things, by 
the doctrine of Chevron deference.205  On the merits of the case, the dissent 
concluded the EPA made a “reasoned judgment,” which consequently solidified the 
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Court’s role as restricted and restrictive.206  In emphasizing that the Court should 
not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative experts, Justice Scalia 
acknowledged the courts’ institutional role as reviewers of agency actions, but 
prioritized the EPA’s institutional role in exercising its specialized decision-making 
capacity within its institutional expertise.207  In contrast, the majority concluded 
that the institutional role of the judiciary was superior to that of the agencies in this 
context, placing more weight on the Court’s responsibility to “say what the law 
is[,]”208 even in light of the general concept of administrative deference and the 
EPA’s specific expertise.209 
There is thus not a single, simple institutional response to the policy goal at 
stake in the context of regulating greenhouse gas emissions from new vehicles.  The 
Court’s decision on the merits in Massachusetts v. EPA, similar to its holding on 
standing, helps to further expose the multi-dimensional aspects of institutions and 
comparative institutional analysis itself.  It helps to illuminate the point that 
different actors within the political processes have institutional roles to play in 
different contexts and have a say in the institutional rules that must be followed in 
those contexts.  Different parties also have a role in referring not just substantive 
disputes but also what one might call border disputes, i.e., questions about who 
decides who decides who decides. 
6. The Dimension of Time in Massachusetts v. EPA 
As suggested in previous sections, one of the multi-dimensional aspects of 
institutions is that they change over time.  There are several time-oriented features 
of the Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA that help to illuminate this concept.  
At its core, the dimension of time recognizes that the appropriateness or 
effectiveness of institutional interventions shifts over time as a function of their 
institutional characteristics, their changing nature, or a combination of both. 
Initially, the dimension of time is central to the Court’s standing inquiry, 
particularly the injury and redressability analyses.  In articulating its injury-in-fact, 
Massachusetts alleged that it faced the threat of harm as a result of the EPA’s 
inaction, noting that rising sea levels due to climate change “have already begun to 
swallow Massachusetts’s coastal land . . . .”210  In evaluating the Commonwealth’s 
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injury, the majority specifically contemplated the effect of time, recognizing that 
“[t]he severity of that injury will only increase over the course of the next century.”211  
Beyond analyzing Massachusetts’s alleged present and potentially future harms, the 
Court also considered temporal implications on its ability to redress these harms 
through judicial intervention.  The majority explained: 
While it may be true that regulating motor-vehicle emissions will not by itself 
reverse global warming, it by no means follows that we lack jurisdiction to decide 
whether [the] EPA has a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it. . . . A reduction in domestic 
emissions would slow the pace of global increases, no matter what happens 
elsewhere.212 
The Court’s institutional role to review and redress is thus not limited to short-
term, holistic remedial action.  Its suitability as the institution that decides who 
decides reflects its institutional flexibility to offer an effective remedy in light of the 
impact of the Agency’s inaction over time.  The majority concluded that the 
plaintiffs could seek judicial intervention even if the Court’s means of redress 
merely required the EPA to consider whether it should take steps that may slow or 
reduce the harm the plaintiffs will likely suffer in the future.213 
The aftermath of Massachusetts v. EPA also exposes the shifting influence of 
institutions over time.  Indeed, while previous sections discussed the lack of 
guidance from the public sector before the Court’s decision, after remand, the 
Obama Administration issued new vehicle emissions standards.214  It is no accident 
that such regulations were a product of a new administration, one that had the 
benefit of the Court’s opinions on the subject and had different views on the public 
sector’s institutional role in mitigating the potential harm posed by greenhouse gas 
emissions.  Once the Obama Administration issued its finding of endangerment 
and corresponding regulations—a product of the institutional constraints imposed 
by Congress as interpreted by the Court215—states again chose to leverage the 
courts’ institutional process.216  The make-up and political leanings of the 
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complaining state institutions were notably different this time around.217  
Ultimately, the regulations were upheld as a legitimate exercise of agency authority 
under the Congressional scheme.218 
*** 
As the preceding discussion in Part II shows, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA helps to reveal the multi-dimensional aspects of institutions in 
complex goal-setting contexts.  Institutional systems—the market, the political 
processes, and the courts—have different institutional components and actors 
within them, and these in turn have diverse and changing interests and allegiances.  
The political process can have executive and legislative actors and functions, and 
those components can be further separated into levels of government: federal, state, 
and local.  The market contains a variety of institutions that help to form civil 
society, including businesses, trade groups that promote business interests, and 
nonprofit groups.  The judiciary has state and federal components, different levels 
of courts within those components, and some specialized courts with discrete 
functions at every level.  These institutional systems and their components are also 
not immune to temporal influences, and characteristics, roles, interests, and 
allegiances can all shift over time. 
The case study of Massachusetts v. EPA reveals institutions to be heterogeneous 
in many ways.  Diverse institutional actors engage in goal-setting and policy-
making that reflect their perceptions of institutional roles and their interests.  
Institutions’ choices regarding how to align themselves—whether collectively and 
collaboratively, or in opposition to other institutions—in pursuit of their goals 
further refracts the dimensional entities.  Moreover, institutions and their interests 
and goals can evolve over time such that a particular institutional system may 
function well in attaining a policy goal in one instance but may exhibit dysfunction 
and incapacity in another. 
Considering the variety of nuanced factors bearing on the search for the 
appropriate institution to achieve optimal or desired policy outcomes, it is no 
surprise that the case study also reveals challenges with attempting to answer the 
question who decides who decides in a straightforward fashion.  But does that mean 
the multi-dimensional nature of institutions is ill-equipped to handle either the 
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complex problems of today or the desired policy goals in a rapidly changing world?  
Quite the contrary.  In fact, I argue, understanding institutions in their multi-
faceted and multi-dimensional glory puts us in a better position to leverage 
institutions as a means of taking on the world’s complex and evolving problems.  
Acknowledging this opportunity, Part III explores the different dimensions, i.e., 
characteristics, of institutions that will help inform meaningful comparative 
institutional analysis in the contemporary age. 
I I I .  UNDE R S T ANDI NG T HE  MUL T I P L E  DI ME NS I ONS  OF I N S T I T UT I ON S  AN D 
T HE I R  I MP L I C A T I ONS  
Neil Komesar’s approach to comparative institutional analysis evaluates the 
choice between three, as I have called them, institutional systems or processes: the 
political process, the market, and the judiciary.  So far in this Article, I have exposed 
the misconception that institutions are monolithic or one-dimensional.  I have 
argued that, in fact, institutions have many dimensions and are far more complex 
than the traditional, one-dimensional view of institutions might suggest.  Part III 
endeavors to explain what I identify as at least seven different dimensional qualities 
of institutions.  We previously explored how the United States Supreme Court 
touched on many of these dimensional elements in Massachusetts v. EPA.  I will now 
formalize the dimensions discussed and elaborate on their significance in 
encouraging a move towards “institutional analysis all the way down.”  I assert that 
multi-dimensional institutions exhibit heterogeneity vertically and horizontally, by 
role and by interest, and over time.  Additionally, institutions are influenced by their 
interdependence and the blurring of institutional lines.  I explore each of these 
dimensions and their implications for comparative institutional analysis, in turn, 
below. 
A. Vertical Heterogeneity 
The first and perhaps most salient way in which institutions are not monolithic 
or, as I prefer, one-dimensional, in the policy-making context is that institutional 
systems can be divided vertically, particularly in the United States.  The American 
institutional system of government is divided into, at a minimum, three levels of 
governing institutions: local, state, and federal.  Each level of government has 
different characteristics, powers, proclivities, and capacities.219  For example, a local 
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or state government is in no position to defend the nation against a foreign invader, 
even with a “well-organized militia.”  Elected officials within local governments are 
generally more attuned to local needs and, as a result, can often set local land use 
policy more effectively than their federal or even state counterparts.220  In contrast, 
the federal government is typically better equipped to address issues of global 
climate change or national disasters, given the need for a large and diverse risk pool 
and an emergency management and response system that is robust in both 
resources and person-power.221 
Vertical diversity within institutional systems is also apparent in the market 
and the judiciary.  Markets are commonly differentiated by scale, ranging from 
global to local.  Among other things, the nature of the good or service being offered 
by institutional market actors such as businesses, trade organizations, and 
nonprofits directly influences the scale of the institution’s market participation.  
For example, the contemporary telecommunications market is more efficient at the 
national and global scale,222 and the market for logistics is dominated by global 
institutions.223  On the other hand, certain markets, for example, those that require 
local or regional expertise,224  are inappropriate for a wider stage: one does not see 
advertisements for whitewater rafting in New York City or duck boat tours in the 
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Iowa plains, for example.  Moreover, a particular type of market—for example, the 
mortgage market225 or the grocery industry226—is not limited to a single scale of 
operation with different institutional actors serving different customer territories. 
Similarly, the American judicial system is not monolithic.  At a minimum, it is 
composed of federal and state jurisdictions and can be further divided into various 
levels of appellate courts.  Each of these institutions serves different functions and 
has roles to play within the greater system.  The complexity of the American judicial 
system with respect to these differences helps to reveal that it is difficult to 
categorize the judiciary, writ large, as an institution that might have a role to play 
in policy-making in different contexts.  As the following discussion shows, however, 
this type of heterogeneity is just one of the multi-dimensional aspects of 
institutions. 
Komesar’s institutional systems are not monolithic, and instead have a rich 
vertical diversity—a dimension of institutional systems that has significant 
implications for our approach to comparative institutional analysis.227  The 
heterogeneity of institutions is not limited simply to their vertical differences, 
however. 
B. Horizontal Heterogeneity 
Another dimension impacting comparative institutional analysis is the 
existence of individual institutional actors within the broader institutional systems, 
i.e., horizontal heterogeneity.  In our governmental system, we see legislatures, 
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executives, administrative agencies, and the like.  Similarly, the market is not a 
single institution.  There are businesses large and small, some of which exist on 
internet and mobile technology platforms and others are more traditional “brick-
and-mortar” entities.  Some move bytes or finances around, some literally build 
with bricks.  The market also includes trade organizations and nonprofits, which 
themselves contain actors of diverse shapes, sizes, reach, and focus.  Within the 
structured vertical system of the judiciary briefly described above, there are many 
different types of courts, varying in focus, expertise, subject matter jurisdiction, 
and territorial reach.228  I will discuss, shortly, the ways in which these institutions 
differ in focus, orientation, and interests.  For now, let us recognize that such 
different actors exist, and thus institutional systems have within them institutions 
that reflect horizontal heterogeneity. 
C. Role Heterogeneity 
Beyond the mere existence of different institutional actors within each 
institutional system, those actors have diverse institutional roles to play—what I 
refer to as role heterogeneity.  This dimension provides strong support for the need 
to evolve past traditional comparative analysis, because an institution’s role, 
particularly in its relation to and interaction with other institutions and other 
institutional systems, is a critical factor in analyzing whether it is best suited to 
further a specific goal.229  The separation of powers doctrine provides a simple 
example of role heterogeneity: the legislature makes the law, the executive enforces 
the law, and the judiciary interprets the law.230  As we saw in Massachusetts v. EPA, 
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administrative agencies, typically part of the executive branch, also issue 
regulations and enforce those regulations.231  There are countless institutional roles 
acting in a market economy.  Businesses generally generate revenue, deliver goods 
and services, and provide employment.  Trade organizations typically focus on 
facilitating collaboration between companies in a particular industry.  Nonprofits 
advocate for a shared point of view or social cause.  Courts, too, play a range of 
institutional roles beyond their common function of providing a mechanism for 
dispute resolution.  The nature of the forum offered by a particular judicial 
institution impacts who may invoke its authority and how effective it can be in 
attempting to resolve the issues raised.  Furthermore, there are many potential 
institutional roles a particular court could fill, as evidenced in questions regarding 
whether the court has original or appellate jurisdiction; enjoys either limited or 
general jurisdiction;232 specializes in a particular issue, such as mental health or 
drug courts; or serves a particular community, as does the Red Hook Community 
Justice Center in Red Hook, Brooklyn.233 
On the national stage, institutional government actors have taken different 
stances over the last decade vis-à-vis other members of the political process.  
Governors and state attorneys general from a variety of states have taken issue with 
actions of the federal executive branch, and challenged these actions, essentially 
because they were inconsistent with the perceived institutional role of the executive 
actor.  For example, states have brought lawsuits objecting to the immigration 
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community-based, problem-solving courts generally, see Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug 
Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 831 (2000); Judith S. 
Kaye, Rethinking Traditional Approaches, 62 Alb. L. Rev. 1491 (1999). 
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policies of both President Obama and President Trump234 and sued the 
Environmental Protection Agency for either protecting the environment too 
aggressively or not aggressively enough.235  Similarly, Congress attempted to defend 
the Defense of Marriage Act when the Obama-era Justice Department would not do 
so.236  With all this internal conflict over how to define institutional roles, it is clear 
that the political process as an institutional system is not monolithic. 
Interestingly, clear and specifically defined institutional roles will also prevent 
an institutional system from being monolithic.  The presence of different courts 
with distinct purposes necessarily requires a more discerning analysis for 
interested parties to reliably identify which court can best address their issues.  If 
the parties can find the correct venue, these specialty courts are designed to resolve 
a particular type of problem in an effective and efficient way.  For example, the 
Court of International Trade, the Federal Circuit,237 and a specialty Integrated 
Domestic Violence Court each have particular jurisdictions, and their judges and 
court personnel have developed a narrow expertise.  Indeed, a particularly 
successful judicial innovation in recent years has been the growth of so-called 
“problem-solving courts.”238  These courts typically specialize in a particular subject 
matter or geographic area, develop an appreciation for local needs and resources, 
and become familiar with the practitioners and litigants and the problems they 
                                                                    
234  Elise Foley, Over Half the States Are Suing Obama for Immigration Actions, Huffington Post 
(Jan. 26, 2015, 6:54 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/26/states-lawsuit-immigration
_n_6550840.html [https://perma.cc/8XS6-HTR8] (describing lawsuits by conservative states 
against the Obama Administration related to immigration polices); Tal Kopan, Blue States Sue 
Trump Over DACA, CNN (Sept. 6, 2017, 7:07 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/06/politics/daca-
trump-states-lawsuits/index.html [https://perma.cc/7Y5J-97MH] (describing lawsuits by 
progressive states against the Trump Administration over immigration policies). 
235  Timothy Cama, States Sue EPA Over Carbon Rule for New Power Plants, The Hill (July 1, 2016, 
3:51 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/286307-states-sue-epa-over-carbon-rule-
for-new-power-plants [https://perma.cc/RG7G-V7S3] (describing lawsuits by conservative states 
against the Obama Administration over what they believed were overly aggressive environmental 
policies); David Shepardson, States Sue Trump Administration over Delayed Fuel-Economy Fines, 
Reuters (Sept. 11, 2017, 10:40 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-vehicles-suit/states-
sue-trump-administration-over-delayed-fuel-economy-fines-idUSKCN1BM1WL [https://perma
.cc/Q469-TXBX] (describing lawsuits by progressive states over the Trump Administration’s 
environmental policies for their failure to protect the environment). 
236  United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 753–54 (2013). 
237  Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1, 4 (1989) (describing the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit). 
238  For an overview of the origins of problem-solving courts, see Greg Berman & John 
Feinblatt, Good Courts: The Case for Problem-Solving Justice 15–30 (2005). 
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face.239  These localized courts are generating better long-term outcomes for their 
participants and the community as a whole240 by cultivating their expertise in the 
subject matter and local contexts impacting the individuals who come before 
them.241  Compared to a judge with a specialized focus, judges in a large jurisdiction 
with general subject matter dockets are generally less likely to develop a nuanced 
awareness and appreciation of the problems they have been asked to resolve.242  In 
attempting to resolve those problems, a judge with a particular focus and a 
developed expertise is also in a better position to experiment with different 
strategies to optimize the outcomes for the litigants before her—something a 
generalist jurist typically cannot do.243 
In sum, our institutional systems exhibit role heterogeneity that is often 
reflective of our collective understanding of their different origins, the norms that 
govern their functioning, and the collective expectations we have about how and 
when they should carry out their functions.  Such subjective factors, as well as the 
specialization of roles within an institutional system, demonstrate how essential it 
is to include this dimension in our approach to comparative institutional analysis. 
D. Interest Heterogeneity 
The heterogeneity of interests among and between institutions reflects the 
further refracting of institutional characteristics beyond vertical and horizontal 
differentiation and distinctions in their roles.  Looking to the market institutional 
system as an example, its nonprofit institutional actors will likely have interests 
different from for-profit entities and individual market actors.  Indeed, even 
                                                                    
239  For a description of different types of problem-solving courts, see, for example, Greg Berman 
& Aubrey Fox, From the Benches and Trenches: Justice in Red Hook, 26 Just. Sys. J. 77 (2005) (describing 
the Red Hook community court in Brooklyn, NY); Dorf & Sabel, supra note 233 (describing drug 
treatment courts); John Feinblatt et al., Institutionalizing Innovation: The New York Drug Court Story, 
28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 277 (2000) (describing drug courts in New York City). 
240  On the features and benefits of problem-solving courts, see Raymond H. Brescia, Beyond Balls 
and Strikes: Towards a Problem-Solving Ethic in Foreclosure Proceedings, 59 Case West. Res. L. Rev. 
305, 315–17 (2009).  For a description of the different models of problem-solving courts, see Pamela 
M. Casey & David B. Rottman, Problem-Solving Courts: Models and Trends, 26 Just. Sys. J. 35, 36–59 
(2005). 
241  See, e.g., Jonathan Lippman, Remarks, Achieving Better Outcomes for Litigants in the New York 
State Courts, 34 Fordham Urb. L.J. 813, 819–22 (2007) (discussing the success of the Red Hook 
Community Justice Center). 
242  For arguments in favor of judicial specialization, see generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers 
for Specialization, 61 Brook. L. Rev. 67 (1995). 
243  See generally Dorf & Sabel, supra note 233. 
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institutions within the same sub-sector—such as nonprofits in the market system—
can, and often do, have very different interests.  For example, two different 
nonprofits may take different positions and have differing interests regarding the 
environment.  On the one hand, an environmental group, Riverkeeper, has interests 
in promoting the protection of waterways—specifically the Hudson River—and in 
increasing the availability and quality of clean water in New York.244  On the other, 
a group like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce may promote the interests of its 
members by seeking to limit agency oversight of its members’ activities.245  
Riverkeeper may seek to further its interests by advocating for additional 
regulations within the political process.  The Chamber would seek just the opposite. 
Another aspect of the complexity and heterogeneity of institutions is that 
sometimes actors within a particular institutional process may take an adversarial 
stance against each other in the pursuit of opposing goals.  Different actors and 
entities within the political process can thus oppose one another, pursuing their 
own policy goals or seeking to defeat the policy goals of other actors within the 
political process.  The head of an executive branch (like a President or mayor), 
legislators, executive agencies, state governments, and state attorneys general all 
can have their own policy goals and can pursue them independently, or in 
coordination with others, and in opposition to still others.  We see this phenomenon 
playing out in the immigration policy setting at present.  The Obama 
Administration introduced several policy approaches to undocumented 
immigrants found in the United States.246  State governments led by Republican 
governors and attorneys general filed suit to enjoin these policies.247  When the 
Trump Administration recently announced plans to roll back these policies 
(arguing, at least in part, that it was forced to do so by the courts and the pendency 
                                                                    
244  See About Us, Riverkeeper, https://www.riverkeeper.org/riverkeeper-mission/ [https://
perma.cc/WV7D-BEBN] (last visited Oct. 5, 2018) (“Riverkeeper’s mission is to protect the 
environmental, recreational and commercial integrity of the Hudson River and its tributaries, 
and safeguard the drinking water of nine (9) million New York City and Hudson Valley 
residents.”). 
245  See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce, et al. v. City of Seattle, et al., U.S. Chamber Litig. Ctr. (Aug. 9, 
2016), http://www.chamberlitigation.com/chamber-commerce-et-al-v-city-seattle-et-al [https://
perma.cc/ZFP9-TQ26] (describing a lawsuit filed by U.S. Chamber of Commerce over proposed 
regulations of ride-sharing companies in Seattle, WA). 
246  For an overview of several of the Obama Administration’s immigration reform efforts, see 
Anna Oguntimein, Note, The Struggle to Rise Above the Shadows Before Sunset: A Critical Discussion on 
the Need to Lift the Expiration and Renewal Requirements of DACA and DAPA, 18 U. D.C. L. Rev. 334, 338–
46 (2015). 
247  United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
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of the litigation against the policies),248 Democratic attorneys general filed suit to 
challenge that reversal of the Obama policies.249  This phenomenon—state 
government actors pursuing challenges to executive actions in the courts—is hyper-
partisan, obviously, but is non-partisan in a way as well: it is a tactic of choice of 
both parties when they do not control the executive branch and executive 
agencies.250  This pattern has repeated itself in the early days of the Trump 
Administration as left-leaning state governments and cities led by liberal officials 
have sought to challenge federal executive and administrative actions.251 
In some ways, perhaps, the fact that institutional actors within the political 
process work towards different and even opposing goals may point to a 
dysfunction—a bug—in the political process.  In others, it is a feature.  The very fact 
that political processes are not monolithic or one-dimensional means that policy 
goals can be pursued in different communities as, we hope, a reflection of those 
communities’ political perspectives, choices, and preferences.  This clash of 
interests, as embodied by government actors, helps to create a process that 
generates policy outcomes that are a reflection of the desires and interests of the 
electorate.252  There is no predetermined outcome of the policy-making process.  
Instead, the outcome is a function of the give-and-take of the political process and 
the tension between different institutional actors.  The institution of the political 
process is not monolithic or one-dimensional, but that is its strength, not its 
weakness.253  Markets and even the judiciary can also work in this way: the interplay 
                                                                    
248  Alana Abramson, White House Says President Trump ‘Wrestled’ with Decision to End DACA, Time 
(Sept. 5, 2017) (describing pressure the Trump Administration faced from litigation commenced 
by conservative state attorneys general over DACA program); Dara Lind, A Group of Republican 
Attorneys General Is Picking a Fight with Trump on Immigration: Not for the Reasons You Might Think, 
Vox (June 30, 2017, 9:11 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/6/29/15895458/
trump-daca-dreamers-immigration [https://perma.cc/PN85-RGXY]. 
249  Kopan, supra note 234. 
250  See Raymond H. Brescia, On Objects and Sovereigns: The Emerging Frontiers of State Standing, 96 
Or. L. Rev. 2, 414–24 (2018). 
251  See, e.g., Patrick McGreevy, California and San Francisco Suing Trump Administration over 
“Sanctuary Cities” Funding Fight, L.A. Times (Aug. 14, 2017, 10:10 AM), http://www.latimes.com/
politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-san-francisco-sues-trump-administration-
1502729412-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/Y2JJ-8D2G] (describing legal actions taken by the 
State of California and City of San Francisco against the Trump Administration). 
252  On the value and purposes of a robust federalism with competition between different levels 
of government, see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assumptions of Federalism, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1763, 1766–
68 (2006). 
253  For a discussion of the extent to which federalism and the structure of government in the 
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of and tensions between different actors within each of these institutional systems 
can generate particular policy outcomes.  These tensions in each of the institutional 
systems, and the tensions that can arise between such systems, help to reveal the 
heterogeneity of institutional interests, which further underscores the need for a 
multi-dimensional understanding of institutions and how they operate. 
E. Institutional Interdependence 
The four previously discussed heterogeneities—vertical, horizontal, role, and 
interest—focus on institutional differentiation, but institutions are also, in many 
ways, interdependent.  Institutional actors, from within different institutional 
systems, can work collaboratively to optimize the pursuit of policy goals when there 
is, at a minimum, an alignment of institutional interests, the jurisdictional 
authority to take action, and a shared willingness to take such action.254  
Massachusetts v. EPA demonstrates the institutional interdependence of state and 
environmental groups’ capacity to leverage the judiciary, which ultimately forced 
the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.255  Similarly, a trade association or 
think tank can lobby Congress—a process specifically designed to create 
interdependence between the political process and the market—in an attempt to 
                                                                    
U.S. promote experimentation, competition, and the “diffusion of power,” see Heather K. Gerken, 
Our Federalism(s), 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1549, 1552–61 (2012). 
254  See, e.g., Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social 
Change? 160–70 (2d ed. 2008) (describing the alignment of interests between courts, Congress, 
and the executive branch in the advancement of civil rights in the mid-1960s).  For a critique of 
Rosenberg, see generally David Schultz & Stephen E. Gottlieb, Legal Functionalism and Social 
Change: A Reassessment of Rosenberg’s, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, 12 J.L. 
& Pol’y 63 (1996).  The notion of interest convergence was identified by Derrick Bell as a race-
neutral basis for the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education.  Derrick A. Bell, Jr., 
Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518, 
523 (1980).  For a further discussion of these forces, see Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold 
War Imperative, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 61, 64–66 (1988).  At the same time, an institution can have no 
authority in a given policy-making realm and still take action, hoping, perhaps, to influence those 
actors that might have some role to play in that setting.  So, while an institutional role might be 
necessary to bring about policy change in a given context, institutions with no formal role or 
authority in that context can certainly attempt to influence institutions that do have such a role 
and authority even if those “powerless” institutions have no functional role to play in bringing 
about the desired policy goal.  To effectuate any such goal, however, institutions must both be 
willing to act and must take action.  The decision of an institution to take no action to intervene 
to stop other actors from taking action, even when that institution has authority to do so, is still 
an institutional choice. 
255  549 U.S. at 534–35. 
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achieve its policy goals by different means.256 
Institutional cooperation is not dependent on a one-dimensional view of 
institutional systems.  Institutional actors who are part of different levels of 
different systems and who have different institutional roles can still choose to 
cooperate in order to achieve a particular policy outcome.257  Even in circumstances 
where theorists have expressed their preference for private ordering—as in studies 
of private actors in the small rural settings of Shasta County, California,258 or the 
cantons of the Swiss Alps259—institutions work interdependently to carry out the 
community’s policy goals.  The private market does not work independently to 
secure the interests and goals of the community.  Rather, even in these communities 
that might appear as paragons of private ordering outside of the watchful eyes of 
the government or the judiciary, the political process, as well as the courts, serve as 
both backstop and referee, sometimes independently and sometimes 
interdependently, to achieve community goals.260  Political actors and the courts 
may also work collectively to respond to serious breaches of norms or serious 
infractions of rules in further service of community goals.261 
Thus, another way in which institutional systems, and the institutions within 
them, are not monolithic is that they do not exist in silos completely separate from 
the operation of the others.  They often work hand-in-hand in an effort to promote 
optimal outcomes.  There is rarely a setting in which one institution or institutional 
system operates completely on its own without some kind of interaction with other 
institutions and systems.  Property law has long been a subject of institutional 
                                                                    
256  See, e.g., Nancy Scola, Exposing ALEC: How Conservative-Backed State Laws Are All Connected, The 
Atlantic (Apr. 14, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/exposing-alec-
how-conservative-backed-state-laws-are-all-connected/255869/ [https://perma.cc/4TTX-2Y8D] 
(describing the influence of the American Legislative Exchange Council, a think tank committed 
to advancing conservative causes through the promotion of legislation at the local, state, and 
national levels). 
257  The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is one example of different institutions 
(state governments) collaborating to seek a market-based solution to lowering carbon emissions.  
For a description of the RGGI, see Jennie Shufelt, New York’s CO2 Cap-and-Trade Program: 
Regulating Climate Change without Climate Change Legislation, 73 Alb. L. Rev. 1583, 1586–89 (2010). 
258  See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle 
Disputes (1994). 
259  Ostrom, supra note 15, at 61–65. 
260  On the function of law’s formal legal constraints to operate where informal means fail, see 
Carol M. Rose, Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 531, 556 (1995). 
261  For a discussion of the interaction of formal and informal rules, set at different levels of 
government, in the pursuit of policy goals, see Ostrom, supra note 15, at 52–54. 
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analysis, and Harold Demsetz’s defense of the private market for property as the 
optimal regime for the regulation of property262 embodies this type of single 
institutional focus.263  But without conducting a comparison of different 
institutional systems—the market, the political processes, and the courts—for the 
regulation of property, one cannot truly proclaim that one system is better than 
another.  This may sound familiar—Komesarian even.  Komesar, in his traditional 
approach to comparative institutional analysis, advocates for comparison, but for 
comparison’s sake.  However, I argue that comparison is necessary because the 
institutional systems are not truly separate—they all work together.  Demsetz’s 
private property regime is a blend of institutions in Komesar’s typology—a market 
backed by the courts and regulators.  The institutional interdependence dimension 
reveals that an institution may be most, or least, helpful in furthering a particular 
goal because of the interdependency among it and other institutions. 
The classic argument for the need for private property is the “Tragedy of the 
Commons,” popularized by Garrett Hardin.264  For many, a private property regime 
is best suited to ensure the proper maintenance of order and the promotion of 
optimal long-term outcomes, including promotion of the best use of the physical 
property at stake.265  But as Elinor Ostrom has shown, community management of 
common-pool resources like pastures and fisheries is possible, and has proven 
superior to private property regimes in certain settings.266  These common-pool 
resources can not only be managed, but managed well, in local settings with certain 
principles in place.267  Rather than resort to strict resource divisions through private 
property constraints, these principles ensure that individuals who utilize the 
resource have a say in setting the rules, play a part in policing and monitoring the 
use of the resource, and have recourse to government fora for the resolution of 
                                                                    
262  See Demsetz, supra note 14. 
263  Cole, supra note 25, at 384–85 (describing Demsetz’s justification of private property as an 
example of single institutional analysis). 
264  Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons: The Population Problem Has No Technical Solution; 
It Requires a Fundamental Extension in Morality, 162 Science 1243 (1968).  “[T]he commons, if 
justifiable at all, is justifiable only under conditions of low-population density.  As the human 
population has increased, the commons has had to be abandoned in one aspect after another.”  Id. 
at 1248. 
265  Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Right Paradigm, 33 J. Econ. Hist. 16, 23 
(1973). 
266  See generally Ostrom, supra note 15, at 182–214. 
267  See generally id. 
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disputes.268  Thus, these communities have proven that a stand-alone private 
property regime does not really stand alone as it is often backed by courts and 
regulators and enforced by the state.  The communities also demonstrate that a 
private property regime is not always necessary to ensure beneficial and successful 
outcomes.269  Indeed, a purely free-market system of property is, at best, a fiction, 
reinforcing the frequency of institutional interdependence.  Even Richard Epstein, 
in arguing for a market-oriented approach to regulation that would subject a wide 
range of political processes to challenges under the Takings Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution and its state corollaries, still requires the intervention of the courts to 
adjudicate such challenges.270  Thus, a blended institutional approach with private 
components, backstopping by the courts, and policing by the political processes, is 
necessary even for some of the most market-oriented theorists. 
F. Blurring of Institutional Lines 
The previously discussed dimensions attempted to draw finer lines, both 
dividing and connecting institutions.  However, a relatively recent phenomenon 
with respect to institutions recognized that these lines can become blurred.  This 
dimension builds on institutional interdependence to further show the difficulty of 
conducting a one-dimensional comparative institutional analysis when selecting 
that single dimension.  Such a one-dimensional approach is obscured with a web of 
connections and blurry boundaries between institutions. 
For example, the market has produced private actors that, in many ways, 
attempt to assume the institutional role of the judiciary as a platform for dispute 
resolution.  Organizations like Modria are playing a critical “judicial” role, 
particularly in disputes that arise in internet commerce, even though they exhibit 
none of the institutional characteristics that are intended to give us faith in the 
judiciary.271  There is little transparency with respect to the selection of “judges,” the 
rules of these fora, or the bases of their decisions.  Similarly, public-private 
partnerships and public authorities deliver services in the market.272  Trade 
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associations or unions may “capture” a single legislator, a majority bloc in a 
legislative body, or an administrative agency.273  Thus, through a blurring of the 
lines between institutional actors, their ability to carry out their institutional roles 
may also become blurred.  This does not necessarily render the pursuit of one’s 
collective-action goals more difficult, though it clearly bears on the assessment of 
available and appropriate vehicles to further that pursuit.  Depending on one’s 
interests and policy goals, blurring of the lines may, perhaps, be advantageous, if, 
for example, one wants to have greater sway over a legislator or agency, or a low-
cost and non-transparent outlet for dispute resolution.  When the lines between 
institutions and institutional systems are blurred, it becomes more difficult to 
engage in comparative institutional analysis that is one-dimensional.  I hope this 
review shows that institutions are multi-dimensional, and the process of 
comparative institutional analysis must embrace these dimensions in order to 
conduct such an analysis with greater focus.  Finally, one last dimension of such a 
multi-dimensional approach to institutional analysis helps to reveal, even more, the 
limitations of such a one-dimensional approach to policy-making when it comes to 
addressing contemporary collective action problems. 
G. Temporal Heterogeneity 
The final dimension of institutions is, perhaps, the most important.  All of the 
different dimensions of institutions are constantly in flux over time.  Thus, each 
institutional characteristic has a temporal aspect to it.  Temporal heterogeneity 
affects all institutional systems and all institutional actors within those systems.  
These systems and actors change and evolve over time, making a one-dimensional 
view of institutions difficult to square with a realistic understanding of and 
appreciation for how institutional systems and the institutions within them 
operate. 
The natural progression of national elections can yield institutional actors with 
very different interests, proclivities, and views of their role in relation to other 
institutional systems.  The Clinton Administration, and later the Bush 
Administration, used an approach to financial markets that encouraged 
deregulation in an effort to spur what they saw as financial market innovation.274  
                                                                    
Public Postsecondary Education, 46 Pub. Cont. L.J. 437, 440–42 (2017).  
273  For a discussion of agency capture and methods for avoiding it, see generally Rachel E. 
Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture through Institutional Design, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 15 (2010). 
274  On the role of financial market deregulation across presidential administrations and its 
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Both administrations went so far as to preempt state governments from regulating 
such toxic products as subprime mortgages and other financial “innovations.”275  In 
the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, the Obama Administration pursued 
regulations—rather than preempting them—by intervening to convince Congress 
to rein in abuses of the market by passing the landmark Dodd-Frank financial 
reform legislation.276  The Trump Administration has taken a very different tack 
with respect to immigration policy than the predecessor administration.277  These 
changes at the federal (and the state) level also tend to modify local institutional 
authority as local governments can be given greater leeway to regulate in a 
particular area or can have that authority stripped and preempted by a “higher” 
authority.278 
Within civil society, businesses can change over time, with a greater emphasis 
on community development one day, and shareholder value the next.279  Recently, 
after a raft of scandals, one of the nation’s longest-standing financial institutions, 
Wells Fargo, has embarked upon a campaign to “re-establish” itself and regain the 
trust of consumers by professing that it is moving away from a focus on profits to 
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federal efforts in the 1990s and 2000s to preempt state predatory lending laws). 
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President, Remarks at Cooper Union on Wall Street Reform (Apr. 22, 2010), 
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277  Nicholas Kulish et al., Trump’s Immigration Policies Explained, N.Y. Times (Feb. 21, 2017), 
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(Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/us/judge-texas-sanctuary-cities.html?
mcubz=3 [https://perma.cc/K9F8-T6A3]. 
279  There is a growing awareness among management theorists that good corporate citizenship 
can be good for business.  See, e.g., Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, The Competitive Advantage 
of Corporate Philanthropy, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Dec. 2002), https://hbr.org/2002/12/the-competitive-
advantage-of-corporate-philanthropy [https://perma.cc/6PG3-W6S5] (describing the value of 
“context-focused philanthropy to achieve both social and economic gains”). 
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address community needs.280  The business strategy of automobile manufacturers, 
and even the definition of what an automobile manufacturer is, will likely shift in 
the coming years as changes in technology and the perceived evolution of market-
demand speed the development and deployment of autonomous vehicles.281  
Nonprofit groups can also have shifting alliances and foci.  Similarly, unions are 
free to modulate their interests, for example, in supporting more restrictive 
immigration policies or encouraging greater legalization of the immigration status 
of undocumented workers.282 
While there are times when an institutional system, like the federal courts, does 
not possess complete control over the scope of its institutional authority, as when 
Congress shapes the jurisdiction of such courts,283 individual constituents of 
institutions can often play a role in shaping the direction and focus of an 
institutional actor in the public sphere.  While the institutional rules can change 
over time, one of the main drivers of temporal change within institutions is when 
the constituents of institutions—the individuals that make up those institutions—
change.  When those constituents change over time, this can impact many aspects 
of that institutional actor: its constituents’ vision of the institution’s own role and 
authority, its desired policy ends, its interests, and many other characteristics of 
that institutional actor.284  For example, a new chief executive officer of a company 
                                                                    
280  James F. Peltz, Wells Fargo Launches Ad Campaign to Leave Accounts Scandal Behind.  Not Everyone 
Is Buying It, L.A. Times (May 9, 2018, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-
fargo-ad-campaign-20180509-story.html [https://perma.cc/UE4N-BGRC]. 
281  For a description of the state of auto manufacturing in light of technological innovation, see 
Ed Sappin, Will Self-Driving Cars End the Big Automakers?, Forbes (Apr. 13, 2018, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesnycouncil/2018/04/13/will-self-driving-cars-end-the-big-
automakers/#76a7cc28356d [https://perma.cc/F6QA-4B75]. 
282  Michael Kazin, How Labor Learned to Love Immigration, The New Republic (May 13, 2013), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/113203/labor-and-immigration-how-unions-got-board-
immigration-reform [https://perma.cc/KCH2-4KMT] (describing changes in organized labor’s 
approach to immigration policy). 
283  On the authority of Congress to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts, see generally 
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in 
Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1953). 
284  I recognize that this is the first time in which I have discussed the role of different 
constituents (i.e., individuals) within institutions as playing a role in affecting the heterogeneity 
of institutions.  In other dimensional contexts, without the dimension of time, the constituents 
are generally fixed temporally.  It is certainly clear that individual constituents play a significant 
role in the focus, direction, and interest of institutions.  And those constituents’ interests, just as 
those individual constituents themselves, can change over time.  Thus, it is within this 
institutional dimension that it is valuable to focus on who those individuals are and the likelihood 
U N D E R S T A N D I N G  I N S T I T U T I O N S  
55 
may have a different vision for that company than her predecessor or a new leader 
of a religious group may have a different approach to doctrine and religious 
practices than a predecessor.  These individual preferences may result in significant 
changes to their respective institutions, which will likely be recalibrated as new 
individuals are introduced over time. 
There is thus a temporal dimension to all institutions.  An institution may at 
one time appear to serve as an optimal actor or setting by which to achieve 
particular policy goals, but at another, fall out of favor as a result of its changing 
institutional dimensions—shifting interests, roles, and interdependent 
connections.  An institutional actor can serve as a linchpin in the achievement of 
specific policy goals on one day and serve as the barrier to such policy reform the 
next.  One need look no further than the judiciary to see how this phenomenon can 
play out.  The makeup of the judiciary can change to make it more receptive to 
different claims of different sectors and institutional actors at different times.  The 
federal courts served as critical institutional actors in the struggle for civil rights 
through the mid-1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s.285  The federal judiciary then became 
more conservative due to a concerted and conscious effort that was, in no small 
measure, a response to the institutional role the courts had played in advancing 
such rights.286  As the federal courts shifted toward conservatism and were no 
longer receptive to efforts to enforce civil rights protections, other institutional 
actors that sought to advance civil rights looked for alternative fora in which to 
pursue them.287 
The temporal dimension has a significant impact on comparative institutional 
analysis because institutional characteristics, institutions, and even institutional 
systems shift and change over time.  An ally one day can be an opponent the next.  
The ability of an institutional actor to bring about change in a particular policy 
setting can ebb and flow over time depending on changes in the specific 
                                                                    
that those individuals may change over time.  The identity and interest of those constituents has 
clear institutional ramifications, and it is here that the heterogeneous characteristics of 
institutions is perhaps most salient.  
285  For an overview of nearly a century of attempts to use the courts to combat desegregation, 
from 1883 to the early 1970s, see generally Stephen L. Wasby et al., Desegregation from 
Brown to Alexander: An Exploration of Supreme Court Strategies (1977). 
286  William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History?  Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights 
Game, 79 Calif. L. Rev. 613, 618–35 (1991) (describing the transformation of the federal judiciary in 
relation to its receptivity to civil rights claims from the early 1960s through the late 1980s). 
287  See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, Beyond Parity: Section 1983 and the State Courts, 54 Brook. L. Rev. 
1057, 1057–58 (1989) (describing state courts as “the new frontier of civil rights litigation” in light 
of the conservative turn in the federal courts). 
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institutional constituents of that actor.  Other changes can include the authority 
granted to that actor, the willingness of a particular actor to wield the authority it 
has or perceives it has, and the resistance from other actors in the setting to such 
change—which itself may also change over time.  Thus, this temporal dimension of 
institutions, like all of the other institutional dimensions described previously, has 
profound implications for the pursuit of policy goals in general and the discipline 
of comparative institutional analysis—issues I discuss in the final Part below. 
Institutions are not static over time.  Leaders retire or die.  Elections usher in 
new administrations.  People have a change of heart.  These all have implications on 
the nature of the institution or institutions such individual constituents populate.  
Returning to the issue of regulating the financial system, do the different 
approaches of different administrations mean that the American executive branch, 
and its attendant agencies, are incapable of regulating the financial sector?  No.  
Does this mean that as an institutional system, government institutions should not 
regulate financial products?  No again.  It simply means that, at different times, 
institutional systems, the institutions within them, and even the constituents that 
make up those institutions may show more of an inclination towards oversight than 
at others.  Those systems may contain actors within them that have the capacity to 
do so but choose not to.  Thus, while an institutional system at one point in time 
may be the institution of choice to regulate a particular market, due to changes in 
the constituent makeup of the actors within the institutional system, they may not 
be inclined to do so, and therefore might not serve as the institutional system of 
choice to regulate that system at a particular point in time.  Thus, time is another 
critical dimension of institutions. 
*** 
As described above, institutions and, in turn, the institutional systems in which 
they operate are multi-dimensional.  As Komesar asserted that it is fruitless to 
conduct single institutional analysis,288 I argue it is also futile to conduct 
comparative institutional analysis with a monolithic or one-dimensional view of 
institutions.  In order to obtain meaningful results, comparative institutional 
analysis must incorporate and consider the realities of institutions as multi-
dimensional entities.  In the next Part, I will explore the implications of this multi-
dimensional view of institutions and institutional settings. 
I V.  I MP L I C AT I ONS  OF  I NS T I T UT I ONS  WI T H MUL T I P L E  DI ME N S I O N S 
The traditional view of comparative institutional analysis suggests that one 
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must select the proper institutional system—the markets, courts, or political 
processes—to determine the appropriate platform through which one can achieve 
a particular policy goal.  But these institutional systems are not one-dimensional 
and can shift and evolve over time.  Furthermore, the systems are interdependent, 
and their different institutional actors might at times collaborate, but may at other 
times oppose one another.  These choices of institutional alignment may be in 
pursuit of an institution’s own policy goals or to thwart an adversary’s efforts to 
achieve its own policy goals.  Institutional systems, and the institutional actors that 
operate within, between, and across them, exhibit a heterogeneity in many different 
characteristics that reflects a diversity and complexity that makes one-dimensional 
comparative institutional analysis difficult.  In the same way that single 
institutional analysis is an insufficient means of achieving desired policy goals and 
outcomes, a failure to recognize the multi-dimensional aspects of institutions, their 
interdependence, and their tendency to change over time makes effective 
comparative institutional analysis in the service of achieving policy goals less 
effective than it could otherwise be. 
A look at the current issue of immigration reform can help highlight the 
implications of a multi-dimensional approach to goal-setting and comparative 
institutional analysis.  Multi-dimensional comparative analysis ultimately provides 
a more valuable means of furthering policy goals, but the results are dependent on 
what those goals are.  In this context, we can see various policy preferences 
emerging as potential goals for immigration reform.  Thus, before beginning to 
analyze institutions, we must ask: what does immigration reform even mean?  For 
some, it might mean that we close the border and deport all undocumented 
individuals in an effort to reduce the perceived threat of terrorism or to preserve job 
opportunities for U.S. citizens.289  For others, it might mean that we take an 
approach that is charitable and generous, recognizing that by making contributions 
to community life, people deserve a role in that community even if they entered it 
or remain illegally.290  Still others might see immigration reform as a road toward 
greater economic development, as a means of promoting diversity and recruiting 
                                                                    
289  For an argument for stronger security and border protections, see Marion Smith, Solutions 
for America: Developing a Strong Border and Immigration Policy, Heritage Found. (Aug. 17, 2010), 
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/Solutions_23.pdf [archival unavailable]. 
290  For a historical overview of the role of immigration policy in U.S. political and economic 
history, see Faye Hipsman & Doris Meissner, Immigration in the United States: New Economic, Social, 
Political Landscapes with Legislative Reform on the Horizon, Migration Pol’y Inst. (Apr. 16, 2013), 
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individuals who can contribute to economic life and innovation.291  Still others 
might focus on notions of fiscal responsibility, appreciating the reality that 
deportation of millions of undocumented immigrants would simply be unworkable 
and too costly.292  Levels of consensus on these issues fluctuate over time.  It appears 
a broad consensus is again emerging—similar to that which emerged in the mid-
2000s and again before that in the 1980s—that acknowledges the need to preserve 
restrictions on immigration, offer businesses opportunities to meet their staffing 
needs, and provide some sort of recognition for those undocumented individuals 
and families who are presently in the United States and contributing to their 
communities a way to achieve a lawful status.293  We can see that setting policy goals 
may itself be a complex task, but complexity is not a factor from which multi-
dimensional comparative analysis shies away.  Regardless of how our policy 
preferences and choices comport with others’ on, for example, immigration reform, 
my multi-dimensional approach provides the depth and flexibility needed to 
analyze the institutional aspects of immigration reform without the burden that a 
one-size solution must fit all. 
In the traditional approach to comparative institutional analysis, a central 
question is one that asks who decides who decides?  However, to approach institutions 
with a multi-dimensional view, an additional range of new and discerning 
questions must be asked to appreciate the diversity and complexity of real-world 
institutions.  Expanding the scope of the questions asked helps to unearth the 
different qualities of institutions that I have identified here: their various 
heterogeneities, interdependence, and their shifting nature over time.  Identifying 
the relevant characteristics of different institutional actors in a given context, such 
as immigration reform, and asking a new set of questions can help determine the 
best actor or actors and the best institutional setting or settings in which those 
actors can carry out desired policy goals and outcomes.  But to do so, we must 
formally incorporate questions other than simply who decides who decides to achieve 
a deeper and richer structure for comparative institutional analysis.  While it may 
                                                                    
291  Id. 
292  The conservative American Action Forum estimated that it would cost the U.S. between $400 
and $600 billion to deport over eleven (11) million undocumented individuals.  Laura Collins & 
Ben Gitis, The Budgetary and Economic Costs of Addressing Unauthorized Immigration: Alternative 
Strategies, Am. Action F. (Mar. 6, 2015), https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/the-
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293  Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Policy and Politics of Immigrant Rights, 16 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. 
L. Rev. 387, 414–20 (2007) (describing efforts in Congress to pass bi-partisan immigration reform). 
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seem trite or trivializing to utilize the questions that I have identified, they might 
prove useful in the development of a multi-dimensional approach to institutions.  
Such questions include the following:  What are the decisions those institutions 
might make?  Where might they make them?  When might they make them?  How 
might they make them?  And finally, why is the institution interested in making a 
decision?  Thus, we do not simply ask who decides, but we also ask the what, where, 
when, how, and why of the institutional actors involved in any policy-making setting.  
In Komesar’s inquiry, the who in the question who decides who decides refers only 
to the institutional system (the political process, the market, or the courts), telling 
just part of the story.  Under a multi-dimensional approach, the definition of “who” 
is far more nuanced and complex:  Is it a particular institutional actor at a particular 
institutional level?  Is there a particular sub-sector of an institutional setting that 
might effectively enable the pursuit and achievement of the intended policy goal?  
Are there particular alignments among institutions within institutional systems, 
across such systems, and between these systems that might help to further that 
goal?  Is there a particular time to advance a particular policy goal?  And are there 
particular institutional allies and interdependencies between or among 
institutional systems that one might seek out in doing so? 
Returning now to the topic of immigration reform, we can apply our 
appreciation of the multi-dimensional nature of institutions to ask: does a 
particular political actor, at a particular level of government, with particular 
interests, with relevant authority, make the decision with respect to questions of 
immigration reform?  The political process system is the obvious place to start in 
this context relating to determinations of who can enter the country legally and who 
can obtain citizenship.294  Congress has the authority to regulate immigration.295  It 
has, in turn, delegated much of that authority to the executive branch to carry out 
Congress’s goals as embodied in statutes.296  So, in terms of the scope of 
immigration reform, the question who decides who decides seems fairly 
straightforward. 
One may be tempted, in such an apparently clear-cut case, to settle for the 
                                                                    
294  See generally Kit Johnson, Immigration Preemption after United States v. Arizona, 161 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. Online 100 (2012) (discussing federal preemption of immigration law and policy). 
295  Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and 
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T H E  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  N E W  H A M P S H I R E  L A W  R E V I E W  1 7 : 1  ( 2 0 1 8 )  
60 
traditional one-dimensional approach to comparative analysis.  But even in this 
context, the monolithic approach is lacking because the answer to the question who 
decides who decides is still, at best, murky.  Litigation over President Obama’s 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program and the ban on travel from 
several predominantly Muslim countries reveal that other institutional actors have 
both an interest in and a role to play in answering this question.297 
So who decides who decides in this context?  It would seem that the courts have 
a role to play in adjudicating the dispute over the proper role of the Constitution 
and legislation to create limits on the grant of authority to the executive.  Moreover, 
this is not simply a dispute between co-equal branches of government with the 
courts playing the role of referee.  Actors from within the political process 
institutional system are also asserting a role in the dispute.  For example, state 
attorneys general, suing on behalf of their constituents and their states’ public 
universities, are testing the limits of executive branch authority.298  Other litigants 
challenging immigration policies include nonprofit organizations that serve 
individual constituents affected by these policies, as well as those individual 
constituents themselves.299  We thus see this conflict exposing intra-systemic rifts 
(executive branch against executive branch), tensions across vertical heterogeneity 
(state against federal), and cross-systemic conflict (nonprofits and private 
individuals invoking the courts).  These cross-cutting conflicts reveal the complexity 
and multi-dimensionality of institutions, which, particularly in this context of 
immigration reform, are a function of the role and interest heterogeneity among 
institutional actors with a stake in immigration policy. 
The impact of the vertical and interest heterogeneity dimensions is evident 
when we look at the ongoing conflict over so-called “sanctuary cities.”  On this issue, 
local executives and legislatures are engaged in an effort to determine the extent of 
their role in immigration reform because they have an interest in any resulting 
policy changes.300  Local governments, concerned with public safety, believe that 
they should have the authority to set policy that affects immigrants, even if it is not, 
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299  See Cogan Schneier, Thorny Battles Loom for Lawsuits Against Trump’s DACA Repeal, Nat’l L.J. 
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300  Barbara E. Armacost, “Sanctuary” Laws: The New Immigration Federalism, 216 Mich. St. L. Rev. 
1197, 1250–51 (2016) (describing a “new immigration federalism” the recognizes the public safety 
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per se, immigration policy.301  This creates a vertical conflict with the federal 
government, where one would typically think that immigration law and regulations 
need to be set.302 
Beyond typical institutional alignments, we see that immigration policy is not 
neatly and exclusively cabined within federal policymaking arenas.  Local 
governments have a deep interest in criminal justice, health and safety, and 
economic development issues.303  They are, predominantly, the loci of much 
criminal justice enforcement and policymaking, health and safety regulation, and 
economic development.304  These interests are at the heart of local police powers.305  
Immigration policy affects these domains.  At the local level, undocumented 
immigrants—and even documented immigrants—might not come forward to file 
criminal complaints for fear that law enforcement authorities might question their 
immigration status.306  Consequently, criminal activity may not come to the 
attention of local authorities who would typically be in the best position to enforce 
criminal statutes.  This sense of lawlessness, or at least the degradation of the rule 
of law, should concern all levels of government, but especially the local level.  There, 
where these issues tend to play out, local governments will face the prospect of 
rampant criminality with little recourse against the perpetrators.307 
Additionally, businesses, in aggressive pursuit of their profit-making interests, 
might perceive few barriers to engaging in wage theft or worker abuse in an 
environment where undocumented workers are afraid to speak out.308  Similarly, 
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landlords may flout health and safety requirements in immigrant housing if they 
believe their immigrant tenants will not report those landlords to local 
authorities.309  These actions of market institutions undermine community 
economics and pose a real threat to the safety of the entire community, not just 
immigrants.  Fires do not discriminate.  They do not spread only to buildings where 
immigrants reside.  Local governments, responsible for protecting residents of 
their communities and promoting economic health, thus have an interest in policies 
related to immigrants despite the federal government’s usual monopoly on 
immigration legislation.310 
So the question who decides who decides in immigration reform is a complex one.  
It may be the ultimate question to reach some definitive conclusion on which 
institution is best suited to further a particular policy goal or outcome.  But before 
one can reach the point of decision, one must ask a number of different questions—
what, where, when, how, and why—that expose the multi-dimensional aspects of 
institutions.  It is an appreciation for those institutions’ multi-dimensionality that 
helps advance one’s policy goals and achieve one’s desired policy outcomes more 
efficiently. 
These six questions align with the different dimensions of comparative 
institutional analysis.  The what of institutional choice, in fact, corresponds with 
several dimensions.  It first implicates the preliminary question in all types of 
comparative institutional analysis: what is the policy goal or outcome one seeks?  
That is the first of the what questions.  Then we can turn to the issue of vertical 
heterogeneity, asking in which institutional level might the best entity or actor 
reside to address or adjudicate a particular problem in order to achieve a particular 
policy goal or outcome?  Of course, institutions and actors have many dimensions; 
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verticality is just one of them.  The final what question is to identify the dimension 
of institutional analysis that reveals where institutional actors might straddle 
different systems, i.e., where we might see blurred lines between institutions.  One 
would want to identify those institutions that might not have clear institutional 
alliances or characteristics because they might be agile actors that can take on the 
institutional roles or capacities of different systems: that is, hybrid institutions.  
These blurry-lined hybrids will not always provide the optimal means of furthering 
a select policy goal—hybrids might possess greater enabling powers or authority or 
may be less effective than an institution with clearer lines and limits.  Either way, 
identifying and understanding hybrid institutions is an important exercise to 
incorporate into one’s comparative institutional analysis. 
Proceeding through the other dimension-revealing questions, the next one to 
ask is where a particular decision, policy change, or action could take place—what 
Elinor Ostrom calls “an arena for action.”311  For Ostrom, this is the place to explore 
and carry out particular policy goals.312  For the question where, we should explore 
the institution’s vertical heterogeneity.  We will want to look carefully at what level 
of government, what type of market, or what level of court might be in the best 
position to address a particular problem in furtherance of a policy goal or outcome.  
Of course, identifying the appropriate arena for action cannot occur in a vacuum, 
and we must continue to ask the other questions in order to inform a multi-
dimensional understanding of the optimal institution to address a particular policy 
goal. 
Next, we ask when an institution should make a particular decision.  This 
question invokes the temporal heterogeneity of institutions—the idea that they can 
change over time.  Thus, when seeking a specific policy goal, one has to ask when is 
the best time to pursue it by inquiring into alliances among particular institutions 
and engagement in particular arenas of action.  Under the political process 
institutional system, advocacy before the Obama administration on certain issues 
looked very different from advocacy before the Trump administration.  Similarly, 
one is likely to find varying receptivity to a particular policy goal in different 
adjudicatory fora at different times.  For decades, advocates believed that the Texas 
state court system was a fertile field in which to bring personal injury actions 
because of the increased likelihood of a Texas jury granting plaintiffs larger 
damages awards.313  Then, the state legislature stepped in to limit the authority of 
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Texas juries, and such beliefs no longer held true.314  By the same token, the federal 
judiciary appeared more receptive to civil rights claims in the 1950s and 1960s315 and 
to advocates for property rights in more recent years.316  As we can see, timing has a 
significant effect on which institution is most appropriate to use in pursuit of a 
particular policy outcome or goal, thus compelling us to ask when. 
The next question to ask is how, i.e., how does one go about pursuing a 
particular policy goal or outcome vis-à-vis the institutions at play and those that 
have a stake in the particular objective.  This leads one to explore not only the 
institutional roles that candidate institutions may fill with respect to that goal or 
outcome but also the ways in which those institutions are interdependent.  When 
there is an alignment of interests between institutions, they can work 
collaboratively to achieve select goals; when those interests are not aligned, they will 
likely stand in opposition to one another.  How institutions go about making 
decisions speaks directly to role heterogeneity and institutional interdependence, 
two critical dimensions when considering the multidimensional aspects of 
institutions. 
Then, one asks why.  Why might a particular institution, at a particular time, 
have a particular interest in the achievement of a particular policy goal or outcome?  
This addresses interest heterogeneity.  Uncovering the interests of candidate 
institutions is essential to understanding whether institutional interests align with 
one’s own interest in the pursued policy.  Such an understanding is essential for 
meaningful comparative institutional analysis to weed out institutions with 
incompatible interests in favor of more synergistic relationships. 
By examining these five questions and the institutional dimensions they 
implicate, one can confidently return to the core question of comparative 
institutional analysis—who decides who decides. 
                                                                    
314  For a description of tort reform in Texas, see Frank B. Cross, Texas Tries Tort Reform, Tex. Bus. 
Rev. (Feb. 1996) at 1. 
315  Rosenberg, supra note 254, at 49–61 (describing the relative receptivity of federal judiciary 
to claims of civil rights advocates when compared to Congress and the executive branch, which 
would follow the courts with their own support for such claims, but not until the mid-1960s). 
316  See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (recognizing broad claim of 
“regulatory” taking for polices affecting use of coastal land); Kelo v. City of New London, 542 U.S. 
469 (2005) (challenging takings power of local government).  For a discussion of the emergence of 
a “new property” regime, what that recognizes property rights in many contexts, see generally 
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964). 
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C ONC L US I ON 
The term “monolith” is derived from the Greek words for single (monos) and 
stone (lithos), representing the notion that monolithic pillars were carved from a 
single shaft of marble or other stone.317  As I have argued throughout this Article, 
comparative institutional analysis in a complex and rapidly changing world should 
take into account a more nuanced view of institutions—one that is not monolithic, 
but, rather, multi-dimensional.  When we view institutions as one-dimensional—
when we define them strictly by whether they are embodied within the market, the 
political process, or the courts—we fail to develop a full appreciation for all of the 
characteristics and dimensions of institutions.  This makes policy-making more, 
not less, difficult.  In fact, a more robust and durable comparative institutional 
analysis, which appreciates the multiple dimensions of institutions, is better 
equipped to facilitate desired policy goals in the contemporary age. 
I have identified what I believe are the seven dimensions of institutions that 
warrant consideration in a new, multi-dimensional comparative institutional 
analysis.  The core purpose of comparative institutional analysis is to support the 
pursuit of policy outcomes and goals.  In order to better achieve selected policy goals 
and outcomes, one must have an appreciation for the multi-dimensional aspects of 
institutions.  Traditional comparative institutional analysis concerns itself with the 
question who decides who decides, as does my proffered multi-dimensional approach.  
But importantly, I have argued here that asking several more informed questions 
can put one in a better position to appreciate and utilize contemporary institutions 
in their full, multi-dimensional complexity.  To that end, the questions one asks 
must go beyond simply who decides who decides.  These new and, as I have argued, 
essential questions ask not just the who but also the what, where, when, how, and why 
of institutions.  Incorporating these questions into the process of choosing the best 
institution or institutions to address complex and global social issues such as 
climate change, degradation of the rule of law, and income inequality puts us in a 
better position to succeed in doing so.  As our ever-changing world grows in scale 
and complexity, it continues to test the limits of traditional comparative 
institutional analysis, while simultaneously complicating the collective-action 
problems facing our contemporary society.  Multi-dimensional comparative 
institutional analysis is an important instrument to solve these increasingly 
complex issues and holds out the most promise for ensuring society can address the 
complex and growing problems it now faces and will face in the future. 
                                                                    
317  Monolith, Oxford English Dictionary 467 (Paperback ed. 2013). 
